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FORECAST GRAPHS 
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SUMMARY TABLE 
 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure 5.2 3.0 3.4 2.7 2.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 3.6 3.9 4.4 4.2 3.6 
Investment 50.8 -6.8 -21.1 45.0 4.7 
Exports 4.1 9.2 10.4 9.6 6.3 
Imports 18.4 1.1 -2.9 20.2 7.2 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 3.7 8.1 8.2 5.8 3.3 
Gross National Product (GNP) 9.7 5.2 6.5 5.2 3.8 
      
Prices (Annual Growth %)      
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.2 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 2.5 3.4 3.0 3.5 4.0 
      
Labour Market      
Employment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 2,132 2,194 2,258 2,310 2,353 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 195 158 137 125 114 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 8.4 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.6 
      
Public Finance      
General Government Balance (€bn) -1.8 -0.8 0.0 0.0 -1.1 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -0.7 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.3 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 73.9 67.8 63.6 57.8 53.5 
      
External Trade      
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) -11.4 1.5 34.3 -2.5 -3.1 
Current Account (% of GNP) -5.2 0.6 13.6 -0.9 -1.1 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2018 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 101.6 107.0 5.3 1.8 3.4 
Public Net Current Expenditure 29.6 32.1 8.7 4.0 4.4 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 93.2 75.9 -18.6 3.1 -21.1 
Exports of Goods and Services 359.7 396.4 10.2 -0.2 10.4 
Physical Changes in Stocks 6.1 1.2 
   Final Demand 590.1 612.5 3.8 0.8 3.0 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  294.0 289.0 -1.7 1.2 -2.9 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.1 0.5 
   
GDP at Market Prices 296.1 323.5 9.3 0.4 8.8 
Net Factor Payments  -62.3 -71.0 
   
GNP at Market Prices 234.9 253.1 7.7 1.2 6.5 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture, Self Employed Income 3.5 3.0 -0.5 -15.4 
Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 0.7 0.7 0.0 1.6 
Non-Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 87.4 92.6 5.1 5.9 
Other 111.6 126.3 14.7 13.2 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.1 0.3   
Statistical Discrepancy -1.1 -0.5 0.5 
 
Net Domestic Product 202.2 222.2 20.0 9.9 
Net Factor Payments -62.3 -71.0 -8.7 14.0 
National Income 139.9 151.2 11.3 8.1 
Depreciation 73.1 79.3 6.2 8.5 
GNP at Factor Cost 213.0 230.5 17.5 8.2 
Taxes less Subsidies 21.9 22.6 0.7 3.2 
GNP at Market Prices 234.9 253.1 18.2 7.7 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
  
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 65.6 107.4 41.8 
F -61.1 -69.7 -8.7 
Net Transfers -3.1 -3.4 -0.3   
Balance on Current Account 1.5 34.3 32.8 
as % of GNP 0.6 13.6 13.0 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2019 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 107.0 111.8 4.5 1.8 2.7 
Public Net Current Expenditure 32.1 35.3 10.0 5.5 4.2 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 75.9 113.6 49.8 3.3 45.0 
Exports of Goods and Services 396.4 440.7 11.2 1.5 9.6 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1.2 3.0    
Final Demand 612.5 704.4 15.0 2.1 12.6 
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services 289.0 351.8 21.7 1.3 20.2 
Statistical Discrepancy 0.5 -0.1    
GDP at Market Prices 323.5 352.6 9.0 3.0 5.8 
Net Factor Payments -71.0 -77.9    
GNP at Market Prices 253.1 274.6 8.5 3.2 5.2 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture Self-Emp. Income 3.0 3.1 0.1 4.9 
Agriculture, Employee Remuneration 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Non-Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 92.6 98.4 5.9 6.3 
Other 126.3 143.8 17.5 13.9 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.3 0.3     
Statistical Discrepancy -0.5 0.1 0.6   
Net Domestic Product 222.3 246.5 24.1 10.9 
Net Factor Payments -71.0 -77.9 -6.9 9.7 
National Income 151.3 168.6 17.3 11.4 
Depreciation 79.3 82.1 2.9 3.6 
GNP at factor cost 230.6 250.7 20.1 8.7 
Taxes less Subsidies 22.4 23.9 1.5 6.5 
GNP at Market Prices 253.1 274.6 21.6 8.5 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X - M 107.4 79.1 -28.3 
F -69.7 -77.9 -8.1 
Net Transfers -3.4 -3.7 -0.4 
Balance on Current Account 34.3 -2.5 -36.8 
as % of GNP 13.6 -0.9 -13.8 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2020 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
  2019 2020 Change in 2020 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 111.8 116.8 4.4 1.9 2.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 35.3 36.7 4.1 0.4 3.6 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 113.6 123.1 8.4 3.5 4.7 
Exports of Goods and Services 440.7 474.8 7.7 1.4 6.3 
Physical Changes in Stocks 3.0 3.0    
Final Demand 704.4 754.5 7.1 1.7 5.3 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services 351.8 383.3 8.9 1.6 7.2 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1    
GDP at Market Prices 352.6 371.2 5.3 1.9 3.3 
Net Factor Payments -77.9 -80.3    
GNP at Market Prices 274.6 290.8 5.9 2.0 3.8 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2019 2020 Change in 2020 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture Self-Emp. Income 3.1 3.2 0.1 3.2 
Agriculture, Employee Remuneration 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Non-Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 98.4 104.5 6.0 6.1 
Other 143.8 152.8 9.0 6.3 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.3 0.2     
Statistical Discrepancy 0.1 0.1 0.0   
Net Domestic Product 246.5 261.5 15.1 6.1 
Net Factor Payments -77.9 -80.3 -2.4 3.1 
National Income 168.6 181.2 12.6 7.5 
Depreciation 82.1 84.9 2.8 3.4 
GNP at factor cost 250.7 266.1 15.4 6.1 
Taxes less Subsidies 23.9 24.7 0.8 3.2 
GNP at Market Prices 274.6 290.8 16.2 5.9 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2019 2020 Change in 2020 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X - M 79.1 81.3 2.2 
F -77.9 -80.3 -2.4 
Net Transfers -3.7 -4.1 -0.3 
Balance on Current Account -2.5 -3.1 -0.5 
as % of GNP -0.9 -1.1 -0.2 
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The Irish Economy – Forecast Overview 
 
2019 is likely to witness another year of substantial growth for the Irish economy. 
This comes in the face of significant uncertainty with the prospect of a No-Deal 
Brexit hovering over the domestic economy for most of 2019. We believe the 
economy will grow by 5.8 per cent in 2019 before slowing somewhat in 2020 to a 
growth rate of 3.3 per cent. The latter forecast assumes that Brexit does not 
occur next year and is influenced by the slowdown observed in the performance 
of many of the main trading partners of the Irish economy. 
 
Despite the diminishing possibility of a No-Deal Brexit in the short term, the 
recent agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union sees the 
UK committed to a free trade agreement in future trade relationships; this will 
bring immense challenges for various sectors in both the Irish and European 
economies in the years ahead. It could also see significant frictions in negotiations 
amongst European countries as they contend with the different proposals made.  
 
The Commentary devotes considerable attention to regional issues. Two Research 
Notes examine developments in housing markets across the different counties 
over the past ten years. Both pieces of research point to significant variations in 
house price trends across the country with urban areas in particular experiencing 
the most significant housing affordability issues. While prices across the country 
appear to be in line with what fundamental economic variables in the local 
economies would suggest they should be, it is clear that assessments of regional 
house price sustainability need to be updated on a regular basis. Based on 
housing related variables, a Box in the Commentary also examines for potential 
convergence in economic activity across the country during the recent recovery. 
However, indicators suggest that there has been a significant degree of 
divergence since 2007. 
 
Finally, another Box in the Commentary examines the implications for the Irish 
public finances of a significant decline in the windfall component of corporation 
tax receipts. Based on a recently specified dynamic stochastic generated 
equilibrium (DSGE) model, the analysis highlights the vulnerability of the Irish 
public finances to significant variation in these types of taxation receipts. 
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The International Economy  
 
Output 
Key Points 
• Growth in Europe continues to wane in the midst of a deteriorating external 
environment;  
• US and Chinese economies both feeling the negative effects of the trade war;  
• Consensus forecasts point to slower growth for major economies in 2020. 
 
 
Global uncertainty and a more subdued external environment continue to weigh 
on activity in the European economy. Annual GDP growth in the European Union 
declined for the second consecutive quarter in Q3 2019 standing at just over  
1.3 per cent. This is the lowest growth rate in the region since Q4 2013. In the 
Euro Area growth remains at 1.2 per cent. Growth is anaemic in the major 
economics of the Euro Area standing at 0.3, 0.5 and 1.3 per cent in Italy, Germany 
and France respectively. Figure 1 illustrates that declining growth in Europe has 
largely been caused by the weak performance of exports and private 
consumption. The slowdown in global trade is particularly problematic for the 
export-oriented German economy.  
 
Low inflation also continues to persist across the region, averaging 0.7 per cent in 
October 2019, half the rate it was at the start of the year. One of the major 
positives for the European economy over this time has been the strength of the 
labour market. As of Q3 2019 the unemployment rate in the European Union 
stood at 6.3 per cent, a significant decline from the peak rate of 11.0 per cent  
in Q2 2013. 
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FIGURE 1 EU28 – CONTRIBUTIONS TO YEAR-ON-YEAR REAL GDP GROWTH (%) 
 
Sources:  Eurostat, GDP and main components. 
 
Real GDP growth in the UK fell below 1 per cent in Q3 2019 relative to the same 
period the previous year, the lowest rate of annual growth in the country in 
nearly a decade. Figure 2 shows that weak economic performance over this 
period is reflected in particular in the production sector where the annual growth 
rate was negative at approximately -1.5 per cent. Figure 2 also shows that since 
the end of 2017 there has been a drastic decrease in rate of growth in business 
investment, likely reflecting the ongoing Brexit uncertainty. Since Q2 2018 
business investment growth has been negative and remains negative at -0.6 per 
cent as of Q3 2019.  
 
As in the rest of Europe, the labour market in the UK continues to perform 
strongly. Unemployment fell to 3.8 per cent in Q3 2019 and is now on par with 
rates not seen since the 1970s. This is putting upward pressure on earnings which 
grew by 3.6 per cent over the same period. However despite strong earnings and 
weak GDP, inflation in the UK continues to trend downward. As of October 2019 
inflation was 1.5 per cent, down from 2.2 per cent in the same month last year. 
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FIGURE 2 UK GDP, PRODUCTION AND SERVICES (LHS), UK BUSINESS INVESTMENT (RHS), 
YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGE (%) 
 
Source:  Office for National Statistics. 
 
The annual growth rate of real GDP in the US fell to just over 2.0 per cent in  
Q3 2019, the lowest rate of growth in the country since Q1 2016. This was 
primarily due to weak growth in investment and declining exports over the 
period. Gross Fixed Capital Formation fell to 1.4 per cent in the quarter as 
business sentiment continues to plummet. The Business Tendency Survey for 
manufacturing (Figure 3), which is a measure of conditions and confidence in the 
manufacturing sector,1 fell to its lowest point in October since the Great 
Recession. The manufacturing industry, which relies on imports of raw materials 
from abroad, has been significantly impacted by rising prices due to increasing 
tariffs. Export growth was also weak over the period growing by just 0.1 per cent, 
though this was up from -1.7 per cent in the previous quarter. However, private 
consumption, which grew by 2.5 per cent over the same period, continues to give 
cause for optimism. Consumption has been buoyed by a strong labour market in 
which the unemployment rate in October was 3.6 per cent.  
 
Economic growth in the US over the last two years has been boosted by 
stimulatory tax measures enacted by the US administration at the start of 2018. 
However, the impact of this fiscal stimulus is likely to wane in the final quarter of 
2019 and into 2020. This is due to the fleeting impact of the tax cuts which have 
failed to provide a significant boost to investment. In the absence of a fiscal 
stimulus in 2020 the diminishing impact of the tax cuts are likely to put 
downward pressure on US growth.  
 
                                                          
 
1  For more detail on the Business Tendency Survey see: Business Tendency Surveys: A Handbook. OECD (2003). 
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FIGURE 3 US BUSINESS TENDENCY SURVEY FOR MANUFACTURING, NORMALISED 
(NORMAL=100)  
 
 
Source:  OECD data sourced from St. Louis Fed database (FRED). 
 
The major driver of uncertainty in international trade and financial markets over 
the past two years has been developments in the trade dispute between the US 
and China. Figure 4 shows how trade between the two countries has developed 
over this time. Over the course of 2019 there has been a clear decline in the flow 
of goods between the two countries. In Q3 2019 US exports to China fell by 
8.2 per cent on the same period the previous year, while Chinese exports to the 
US fell by 15.2 per cent.  
 
FIGURE 4 US-CHINA SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, Y-O-Y GROWTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  United States Census Bureau, US Export and Import data for goods. 
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Real GDP growth in China fell to 6.0 per cent in Q3 2019, down from 6.2 per cent 
in the previous quarter. Economic growth in the country has been declining since 
2009, which is seen as a natural phenomenon after decades of expansion. 
However, as is the case for the US, growth in China is also being negatively 
impacted by the trade war. Chinese exports fell by 3.2 per cent in September 
compared to the same period the previous year. Stimulatory measures from the 
Chinese government had been relatively tempered through much of 2019 and 
had been limited to some tax reforms and a reduction in banks’ cash reserve 
requirements. However in November, the Chinese central bank cut the short-
term lending rate for the first time since 2015. Though the rate cut was limited to 
five basis points, this may be the start of a more accommodative monetary policy 
stance from the bank as the economy continues to feel the effects of the  
trade war.  
 
Figure 5 summarises the forecasts for GDP growth of the Euro Area, the US and 
the UK produced by individual economists and the major institutions of their 
respective economies. Each forecast signals minimum and maximum forecasts, 
with point values identifying the median of forecasts. These forecasts suggest a 
broad-based expectation of a moderation in economic growth in 2019. In the 
Euro Area growth is forecast to fall to its lowest level since 2013, while in the UK 
growth is expected to be at its lowest point since 2012. Higher growth is forecast 
for the US but is still down on the rate in 2018. Growth in all three regions is 
expected to fall next year, though consensus is wide ranging. 
 
FIGURE 5 REAL GDP, YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH (%) 
 Euro Area     United States      United Kingdom 
  
 
Sources:  EA; FocusEconomics. US; Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. UK; HM Treasury. 
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Developments in oil prices 
Figure 6 displays recent trends in global oil prices. The most significant event for 
oil markets in 2019 was the missile attack on Saudi Arabian oil infrastructure in 
September. This caused oil prices to increase by as much as 20 per cent in a single 
day but the effects were largely reversed within a couple of weeks as production 
capacity was restored. On the demand side, oil prices have been kept subdued 
due to the ongoing trade war between the US and China. Any escalation in trade 
tensions is likely to see a slowdown in economic activity which in turn will lead to 
a downturn in demand for energy. From an Irish perspective, lower oil prices will 
decrease inflation, putting downward pressure on household expenses. 
 
FIGURE 6 CRUDE OIL PRICES ($ PER BARREL) 
 
Source:  St. Louis Fed database (FRED). 
 
International financial developments 
Key Points 
• Volatility in equity markets remains subdued into Q4; 
• The ECB loosens monetary policy with further rate cuts and a return  
to quantitative easing; 
• Sovereign and corporate bond yields fall to historical low. 
 
 
The VIX Volatility Index (Figure 7) was relatively subdued in November following 
some significant fluctuation in the previous months. Known as the ‘fear gauge of 
Wall Street’, the VIX is derived from volatility in the S&P 500 stock index and is a 
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reflection of investor uncertainty about future market conditions. Over the 
course of 2019 the two primary sources of uncertainty in US equity markets have 
been around international trade disputes and monetary policy adjustments by 
the Fed. The Fed implementing a more accommodative monetary policy stance in 
the form of a number of interest rate cuts, coupled with increased optimism that 
a trade deal between the US and China could be reached, helped assure investors 
in October and into November. This is reflected both in the low rates of volatility 
as well as a number of major US equity indices – including the S&P 500 and the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average – reaching record highs. 
 
FIGURE 7 VIX VOLATILITY INDEX (%) 
 
 
Source:  Chicago Board Options Exchange data St. Louis Fed Database (FRED). 
 
Citing inflation that has remained persistently below target and weakening 
growth prospects for the global economy, the ECB cut its policy rate further in 
September (Figure 8). As of November, the Eonia rate, which is the rate at which 
banks can lend to each other overnight, stood at -0.45 per cent. Beyond rate cuts, 
the ECB has also restarted its asset purchase programme, which had been 
suspended since December 2018. This involves the purchase of €20 billion worth 
of sovereign and corporate bonds a month in Eurozone economies, in order to 
increase the money supply and liquidity and lower the cost of credit. However, 
the ECB has continued to stress that monetary policy is at its limit with restricted 
scope for further policy measures should economic conditions deteriorate 
further. In light of this, the bank has argued for increased intervention from 
European governments through stimulatory fiscal policy measures.2 
 
 
                                                          
 
2  See speech by Mario Draghi entitled ‘Farewell remarks’ at the farewell event in his honour in Frankfurt, Germany. 
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FIGURE 8 EURO OVERNIGHT INDEX AVERAGE, EONIA (%) 
 
 
Source:  European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse. 
 
Government bond yields have declined through much of 2019 as central banks 
have continued to loosen monetary policy. Yields have also declined in response 
to downward revisions to economic forecasts for the global economy as investors 
sought refuge in the relative safety of sovereign debt. As of October 2019, yields 
in both Germany and Japan were in negative territory. The prospect of a 
resolution to the trade war between the US and China saw an uptick in US yields 
in October. The US yield curve, which had been inverted earlier in the year, has 
steepened over the final few months of the year helping allay some fears of 
recession. The yield on ten-year Irish government bonds stood at 0.00 per cent as 
of October, having fallen into negative territory for the first time in August. In 
November the ratings agency Standard & Poor’s upgraded Irish sovereign debt to 
a rating on par with its pre-crisis level. This is likely to make the issuance of new 
bonds less costly which is particularly beneficial for the Irish Exchequer as the 
level of outstanding debt-to-output is relatively high by international standards. 
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FIGURE 9 TEN-YEAR GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS (%) 
 
 
Source:  St. Louis Fed database (FRED). 
 
Figure 10 graphs the exchange rate of the euro (EUR) to the US dollar (USD), the 
British pound sterling (GBP), the Swiss franc (CHF) and the Chinese renminbi 
(CNY). These are the currencies of Ireland’s largest trading partners outside the 
Eurozone and their value against EUR impacts on the competitiveness of Irish 
companies in the international market. Following news in late October that an 
extension to the Brexit deadline was likely to be granted by the European Council, 
the value of GBP increased significantly against EUR. The EUR/GBP rate is now 
around the same value it was in the period following the initial extension granted 
to the UK in March 2019. With over 20 per cent of Irish good imports coming 
from the UK, a decline in the EUR/GBP rate is likely to impact on Irish consumers 
and producers in the form of higher inflation.3 The EUR/USD rate has seen a 
general decline over the past two years as economic growth in the US has 
surpassed that of the Eurozone. While rate cuts by both the ECB and Fed over the 
latter half of 2019 have led to fluctuations in the exchange rate, further 
downward revisions to Eurozone forecasts have kept the exchange EUR/USD rate 
subdued. As the US is Ireland’s largest export market, a weakening EUR/USD rate 
is likely to prove beneficial to the competiveness of Irish export firms. The 
EUR/CNY rate increased substantially in August following the devaluation of CNY 
by Chinese policymakers. This gain was largely reversed in the months since, as 
CNY strengthened following positive news concerning the trade war.  
 
                                                          
 
3   For further detail on this see: Allen-Coghlan, Matthew (2019). ‘Exchange rate pass-through – EUR/GBP’, Quarterly 
Economic Commentary (Autumn 2019), ESRI. 
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FIGURE 10 EUR EXCHANGE RATE TO GBP, CHF, CNY, USD (JANUARY 2016 BASE=100)  
 
 
Source:  Eurostat.  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR IRISH EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Key Points 
• Current account declines to record deficit as service imports spike in Q2;  
• Cross-border imports decline in Q3 due to decline in transport and medicinal 
and pharmaceutical products. 
 
 
Goods  
In Q2 2019 the annual growth rate in the volume of Irish goods exports was  
6.2 per cent compared to 11.8 per cent for Irish goods imports. While imports 
growth was higher than exports for the quarter, the trade surplus of €33.2 billion 
shows that international trade remains a significant source of growth for the Irish 
economy.  
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The trade in goods figures presented in the quarterly National Accounts include 
the trade of ownership goods (e.g. contract manufacturing and merchanting).4 
While these traded goods are owned by Irish resident firms, some of these goods 
may never physically cross the Irish border, nor are they produced domestically. 
Therefore, these overall trade figures may not paint an accurate picture of the 
underlying trends in goods trade. In Figure 11 we present the cross-border trade 
statistics which function somewhat more accurately as an indicator of domestic 
exporter performance.5 These statistics only include goods which have crossed 
the Irish border with the exception of aircraft for leasing.6 In Q3 2019, cross-
border exports increased by 10.2 per cent on the same period the previous year, 
while cross-border imports decreased by -13.6 per cent. This resulted in an 
annual increase in the trade balance of €6.9 billion.  
 
FIGURE 11 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE IN CROSS-BORDER IRISH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, (VALUE, 
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Figure 12 plots the four commodity groups that had the largest decline in import 
value from Q3 2018 to Q3 2019. The significant fall in the annual growth of Irish 
cross-border imports in Q3 2019 can be attributed predominately to the decline 
in other transport equipment and medicinal and pharmaceutical products.  
 
                                                          
 
4  ‘Goods for processing’ is dominated by ‘contract manufacturing’, a process in which multinational companies residing 
in Ireland issue contracts to foreign firms to produce goods. Although these goods never enter the Irish economy, 
due to ownership of these goods pertaining to Irish resident firms, sales are recorded as an Irish export. 
‘Merchanting’ consists of the buying and selling of completed goods abroad which at no stage enter or leave Ireland.  
5  For further details on ownership trade, see CSO document ‘Explaining Goods Exports and Imports 2012-2016’. 
6   Figures also include aircraft for leasing regardless of whether they are registered for aviation in Ireland. For more see 
CSO document ‘Moving to a Transfer of Economic Ownership Basis for Trade in Aircraft’. 
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Also observable is a sharp upward trend in the imports of other transport 
equipment in Q4 2018. This commodity group includes aircraft for leasing which 
is highly volatile by nature. If the spike in imports proves to be a once-off event 
then we are likely to see a significant year-on-year fall in the growth of Irish goods 
imports in Q4 2019. 
 
FIGURE 12 IRISH IMPORTS BY COMMODITY (VALUE, € MILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Figure 13 shows the proportion of cross-border trade to Ireland’s main trading 
partners from January to September 2019. The US is by far the largest destination 
for exports accounting for over 30.7 per cent of exports. This emphasises the 
importance of the economic performance of the US for the Irish economy. The 
next largest export destination is Belgium (10.6 per cent) which imports a 
significant proportion of Irish pharmaceutical exports. Great Britain is the largest 
source market for Irish imports (21.1 per cent) followed by the US (16.9 per cent) 
and France (12.3 per cent). 
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FIGURE 13 IRISH CROSS-BORDER EXPORTS (LHS) AND IMPORTS (RHS) BY COUNTRY JANUARY 
TO SEPTEMBER 2019 (PROPORTION %) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Services 
Service imports for the quarter increased by 87.3 per cent compared to the same 
period the previous year. This was primarily due to an increase in business service 
imports which were up by over 227 per cent to €54.8 billion. Meanwhile, service 
exports for Q2 2019 grew by 16.3 per cent compared to the same period the 
previous year. This resulted in a sharp decline in the services trade balance which 
declined by over €32 billion. 
 
FIGURE 14 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE IN IRISH SERVICE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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One of the major components of business service imports is research and 
development (R&D). The majority of R&D imports are comprised of the 
movement of intellectual property by large multinational firms onto their Irish 
balance sheets. Due to the relatively small numbers of multinational firms that 
engage in these practices to a large scale, the value of R&D imports can be 
extremely volatile from quarter to quarter. For confidentiality reasons the CSO 
redacted information pertaining to the size of R&D imports in Q2 2019. However, 
examining the past relationship between business service imports and R&D 
imports reveals a close relationship between the two series. This was most 
evident in Q2 2017 when business service imports grew by 114 per cent primarily 
due to an increase in R&D imports. The correlation coefficient between the two 
series over the period Q1 2012 to Q1 2019 is over 0.97 which strongly suggests 
that the spike in business service imports in Q2 2019 was driven by another 
significant increase in R&D imports. 
 
FIGURE 15 IMPORTS OF SERVICES BY COMPONENT (€ MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Current account 
The Irish current account balance fell to -€26.5 billion in Q2 2019, down from 
€10.6 billion in the same period the previous year. This was largely due to the 
sharp increase in service imports over this time. There was also an increase in the 
primary account deficit to -€20.7 billion, its lowest ever. The current account in 
Q2 2019 bears a similar resemblance to Q2 2017, which was the last time there 
was a negative balance. In that quarter there was also a large increase in service 
imports which was then attributed to R&D imports.  
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FIGURE 16 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (€ MILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Exports are expected to grow by 9.6 per cent this year and then moderate to  
6.3 per cent in 2020 due to the general consensus of a global economic slowdown 
next year. As a result of distortions from multinational activity, we expect imports 
to increase by 20.2 per cent in 2019 and then to moderate to 7.2 per cent  
in 2020. 
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The Domestic Economy 
 
The Domestic section of the Commentary is organised as follows; we initially 
review the outlook for output growth before discussing developments in the Irish 
monetary and financial sectors. Prices in the economy are then discussed, 
followed by a review of demand-side factors such as consumption and housing 
market issues. On the supply side, we then examine developments in investment 
and the labour market before concluding with an analysis of the public finances. 
 
Output 
Key Points 
• Continued strong underlying performance of the Irish economy; 
• Particularly strong when compared to European and UK growth rates; 
• Regional heterogeneity in the recovery of the Irish economy. 
 
 
The CSO recently released its estimates of gross value added for foreign-owned 
multinational enterprises and other sectors. While accounts for the foreign-
owned dominated sector can be significantly influenced by certain large 
transactions, focussing on the ‘other’ sector indicates how the indigenous 
component of the Irish economy is performing. To benchmark these results in 
Figure 17 we plot the year-on-year growth rate for the other sector and compare 
it to the equivalent growth rate for the European Union and the United Kingdom 
over the period Q1 2013 to Q2 2019. 
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FIGURE 17  GROWTH RATE OF THE ‘OTHER’ COMPONENT OF THE IRISH ECONOMY COMPARED 
WITH HEADLINE GDP FOR IRELAND, THE EU AND THE UK, 2013 TO 2019 (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Eurostat and QEC Calculations. 
 
What is evident from the graph is that while the growth rate of the ‘other’ sector 
of the Irish economy is less than the headline rate, it is still significantly larger 
than the growth rates for the European Union and the United Kingdom over the 
period 2013 to 2019. On average, the ‘other’ sector of the Irish economy grew by 
4.5 per cent for that period, while the EU and the UK grew by 1.8 and 2.0 per cent 
respectively. It should be noted that the growth rate does fluctuate to a much 
greater extent which is consistent with the small, open nature of the Irish 
economy. 
 
Given the persistently strong growth rates for the domestic economy over the 
past six years, attention is increasingly turning to the performance of different 
regions in the country. In 2018, for example, the Government published the 
National Development Plan which will underpin the implementation of the 
National Planning Framework (NDP). A key component of this strategy is to 
achieve sustainable growth of cities, towns and villages across the country. 
However, achieving timely estimates of regional growth is particularly difficult in 
an Irish context. In the following Box, Allen-Coghlan and McQuinn present some 
new estimates.  
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BOX 1  NEW ESTIMATES OF CONVERGENCE IN REGIONAL IRISH HOUSING MARKET ACTIVITY 
While aggregate house prices and rent levels have increased to a significant degree since 
the international financial downturn of 2007/2008, growing attention is now focussing 
on the regional nature of the housing market performance. To what extent have price 
and rent levels in the different regions of the country increased and have some areas of 
the country witnessed faster growth than others? In assessing these questions it is 
informative to draw on growth theory which, when addressing this issue across 
countries, typically breaks the issue down into: 
1. Beta convergence; and 
2. Sigma convergence 
Beta convergence is concerned with whether countries/regions with relatively low initial 
values of economic activity grow faster in comparison to countries/regions that start with 
higher values of economic activity. One way to examine for this is to run a regression 
where the dependent variable is the average growth rate of economic activity in a 
country/region and the independent variable is the economic activity in the initial year of 
the study. If convergence takes place over the period in question, then the coefficient on 
the independent variable will be negative and significant suggesting that the growth rate 
over the period is greater for those regions which had a relatively lower level of activity 
in the initial period.  
In addition to beta convergence, sigma convergence is also used to examine whether 
countries/regions converge with respect to the variance of economic activity. In many 
instances, sigma convergence can be tested for by examining a plot of the coefficient of 
variation of economic activity for the regions over the period in question. The coefficient 
of variation is a standardised measure of dispersion for a given distribution. It is defined 
as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean for a particular period. Plotting the 
coefficient for the different periods under review provides an indication of convergence, 
where a decline in the coefficients indicates convergence. Goecke and Hüther (2016) use 
this approach in examining for convergence across countries and regions in the European 
Union.  
Data 
An increasing amount of regional housing market data is now available. House price data 
are now provided on a monthly basis at a county level from 2010 to August 2019. 
Furthermore, the ESRI in conjunction with the Residential Tenancies Board now produces 
rental indicators for 166 local electoral areas on a quarterly basis from Q3 2007, with the 
most recent data being available for Q2 2019 (see Lawless M., K. McQuinn and J. Walsh, 
2018, for more on these indicators). 
Housing market information can be regarded as a proxy for economic activity in a local 
area as often both house price and rental models are specified on the basis of a long-run 
relationship between prices and rents and economic variables such as income and labour 
market data (see Kelly and McQuinn, 2014, for more on this). Thus, variations in housing  
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market data across regions are likely to be highly correlated with variations in the 
underlying economic and labour market data in those regions. 
Results 
The regression results of the beta convergence estimation using the house price data are 
presented in Table A. The dependent variable is the average growth in house prices over 
the period 2010-2019. The explanatory variable is house prices in each county at the 
start of the period (Q1 2010). The regression results using the rent price data are also 
presented, in Table B. The dependent variable here is the average growth in rent prices 
over the period 2007-2019 while the independent variable is rent levels in each county at 
the start of the period (Q3 2007). The coefficients on the explanatory variables in both 
estimations are shown to be both positive and significant. This suggests that over this 
period, a high initial house/rent price is associated with a higher growth rate in house 
prices/rents. In other words, areas that had high house/rent prices to begin with have 
experienced greater appreciation in prices over the last ten years. This suggests that 
there has been divergence in economic activity between counties/LEAs over this time 
period. 
Figures A and B show the results of the sigma convergence estimation in each quarter 
using rent and house price data, respectively. These figures illustrate how the level of 
convergence/divergence between counties/LEAs has developed across time. Figure A 
shows that from 2007 to 2010, during the period immediately following the financial 
crisis, there was convergence in economic activity between LEAs. From 2010 onwards, 
when the economy was in the initial phase of recovery, both graphs paint a similar 
picture with an increasing level of divergence up until 2014. From this point until 2019 
the coefficient of variation appears to be relatively stable with some evidence of 
convergence from the end of 2018. However, it should be noted that due to the presence 
of market regulation in the form of rent pressure zones in the rental market and macro-
prudential rules in the housing market there may be a greater level of divergence than 
suggested by the coefficient of variation. These regulations limit the growth of rents and 
house prices in areas in which upward pressure on prices are greatest and so may cause 
these indicators to underestimate the level of economic activity in these areas. As such, 
the results presented over this period can be thought of as a lower bound on the level of 
divergence, with divergence in economic activity likely higher.  
Conclusions 
The estimates presented here indicate that there has been a significant divergence in 
house prices and rental levels across Irish counties during the period of the economic 
recovery. While the housing market as a whole has experienced a significant increase in 
prices and rents over the past ten years, it is evident that certain areas have grown faster 
than others. Moreover, those areas that had relatively lower prices and rents in both 
2008 and 2010 appear to have experienced relatively lower rates of growth over the 
entire period. From a policy perspective, it is clear that the recently released National 
Development Plan (NDP) must seek to achieve a greater degree of balance in activity 
across the country over the medium term. 
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TABLE A  REGRESSION ESTIMATE RESULTS (HOUSE PRICE DATA) 
Dependent Variable: Average Growth in House Prices (2010-2019) 
Variable Coefficient  (House price at the start of the period) T-Stat 
Constant 0.153 0.029 
House Prices (Q1 2010) 0.006 0.014 
 
Source:  QEC Calculations. 
 
 
TABLE B  REGRESSION ESTIMATE RESULTS (RENT DATA) 
Dependent Variable: Average Growth in Rents (2007-2019) 
Variable Coefficient (Rent level at the start of the period) T-Stat 
Constant -0.009 -4.514 
Rent level (Q3 2007) 0.00003 12.651 
 
Source:  QEC Calculations. 
 
FIGURE A  SIGMA CONVERGENCE BY YEAR (RENT DATA) 
 
Source:  QEC Calculations. 
 
FIGURE B  SIGMA CONVERGENCE BY YEAR (HOUSE PRICE DATA) 
 
Source:  QEC Calculations. 
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This Box was prepared by Matthew Allen-Coghlan and Kieran McQuinn. 
 
While the Irish economy has been subjected to considerable uncertainty in 2019, 
it appears that the headline domestic growth rate is set to be 5.8 per cent. This is 
an increase in the growth rate compared with the last Commentary and reflects 
the better than expected performance of the Irish traded sector in 2019. In 2020, 
as global conditions continue to moderate, it is likely that the economy will 
sustain a more modest growth rate of 3.3 per cent. 
 
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL AND INFLATION OUTLOOK 
Key takeaways 
• Rate of Irish mortgage lending remains steady through 2019 but is down on 
2018; 
• Outstanding loans to Non-Financial Corporations increasing since 2018; 
• Irish inflation subdued despite strong labour market. 
 
Household credit and mortgage market 
Figure 18 presents the annual growth rates of credit to households from Irish 
resident credit institutions.7 The data are split between loans for house purchase 
and other personal loans (auto finance, credit cards, student loans etc.). The 
growth rate of lending for house purchase has increased steadily since 2016 and 
as of Q2 2019 stood at 1.5 per cent. Since Q3 2018 there has also been an 
increase in other personal loans with the growth rate standing at 5.4 per cent in 
 
                                                          
 
7  See CBI, ‘Credit, Money and Banking Statistics: Private Household Credit and Deposits’ A.18 for details. 
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Q2 2019. The increasing stock of outstanding credit is a reflection of an expanding 
economy and, with it, the recovery in the housing market and personal 
consumption. However, these rates remain significantly below the levels they 
were at before the financial crisis when credit growth in some quarters was in 
excess of 30 per cent. Any return to pre-crisis credit levels would be a worrisome 
development given the unsustainability of the credit boom phase.  
 
FIGURE 18 GROWTH RATES OF CREDIT TO HOUSEHOLDS YEAR-ON-YEAR (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Credit, Money and Banking Statistics.  
Notes:  Data are taken from Central Bank of Ireland data release A.18, Growth rates series codes 777 and 1,252.  
 
The growth rate in the volume of new mortgage lending has remained relatively 
stable over 2019 at just below 9 per cent. However, this is down significantly on 
the growth in new mortgage lending in 2018 which averaged 15.4 per cent. In 
Figure 19 the growth in the volume of lending is broken down by the purpose of 
the mortgage. New mortgage lending growth for first time buyers was 14.3 per 
cent in Q3 2019 compared to 8.8 per cent for mover purchase. 
 
Recent research by the Central Bank of Ireland has explored the impact of macro-
prudential rules on the Irish mortgage market.8 This research examines the 
change over time in the proportion of borrowers that are at or close to their 
maximum in terms of the mortgage credit they can obtain under the Loan-to-
 
                                                          
 
8  Robert Kelly and Elena Mazza, ‘A Measure of Bindingness in the Irish Mortgage Market’ Central Bank of Ireland 
Financial Stability Notes, 2019, 12. 
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
Lending for House Purchase Other Personal
24 |  Q ua rt er ly  Eco nom ic  C omme nt ary  –  Wi nt er  20 19   
Value and Loan-to-Income limits. This measure is used as an indicator for the 
level of ‘bindingness’ in the market, i.e. the degree to which the macro-prudential 
rules are curtailing the potential demand for credit. The researchers show that 
level of ‘bindingness’ has increased over time since the measures were first 
introduced in 2015. The study also finds that the highest share of bound 
borrowers are in Dublin where house prices are highest. The demand for housing 
and hence the volume of new mortgage lending would likely be significantly 
higher in the absence of these rules.  
 
FIGURE 19 NEW MORTGAGE LENDING VOLUME GROWTH (%)  
 
 
Source:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland. 
 
Trends in corporate credit market 
Figure 20 shows the outstanding loans to Non-Financial Corporations in Ireland 
from Irish resident credit institutions. In the years preceding the financial crisis 
much of the growth in the Irish economy was driven by the boom in the Irish 
property market. This was fuelled by a significant credit expansion in which loans 
for property related transactions soared. However following the financial crisis in 
2008 and the associated crash in the property market there was a significant 
decline in the level of outstanding loans. Within four years of the peak level, the 
amount of outstanding loans had halved. Outstanding loans continued to decline 
until Q3 2018 when the growth rate turned positive. While the growth rate 
stands at 3.0 per cent as of September 2019, in level terms the value of loans 
outstanding remains more than 75 per cent below the peak level. A smaller 
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amount of loans outstanding may be viewed as a positive development as one of 
the lessons learned from the financial crisis is to avoid growth built on rapid 
expansions in credit.  
 
FIGURE 20 OUTSTANDING LOANS TO NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS  
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
The credit gap is a measure of the difference between the actual and trend level 
of the credit-to-GDP ratio. When the gap is positive, the current level of the ratio 
is greater than trend and when the gap is negative the current level of the ratio is 
less than trend. If the gap becomes significantly large, this may suggest that the 
current level of credit in the economy is unsustainable. Due to a number of 
methodological issues with the standard approach to calculating the credit gap in 
the Irish context, the Central Bank has constructed an alternative measure of the 
credit gap using a model-based approach, using GNI*9 in place of GDP.10 Figure 
21 shows that following the general downtrend in the credit gap in the years after 
the financial crisis, the credit gap in Ireland has been increasing since 2015. After 
three years of consecutive growth, Q4 2018 marks the first quarter that the credit 
gap has been positive since 2010. While still at a very low level in a historical 
context it is imperative that indicators such as this are monitored over time to 
determine the sustainability of the level of credit in the Irish system. 
 
 
                                                          
 
9  This measurement for domestic economic activity attempts to strip away the distortionary effects of in order to give 
a more reliable measure for trends in the underlying Irish economy. 
10  For more on this approach see: Eoin O’Brien, Martin O’Brien and Sofia Velasco, ‘Measuring and mitigating cyclical 
systemic risk in Ireland: The application of the countercyclical capital buffer’ Central Bank of Ireland Financial Stability 
Notes, 2018, 4. 
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FIGURE 21 CENTRAL BANK MODEL BASED ESTIMATE OF CREDIT GAP (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
Interest rates and the cost of finance 
Figure 22 shows that the cost of credit for Irish consumers is relatively high in 
comparison to other Euro Area countries. The average annual interest rate on 
new house loans in Ireland was 2.9 per cent in September 2019 compared to just 
1.9 per cent in the Euro Area. Over the course of 2019 there is a clear downward 
trend in the rate of interest on house purchase in the Euro Area. This corresponds 
with the ECB loosening its monetary policy by setting policy rates lower 
throughout the year. In Ireland on the other hand there is little evidence that 
lower policy rates are being passed on to consumers as the interest rate in 2019 
has remained relatively flat. The Research Note in this Commentary by Allen 
Coghlan et al. (2019) show that affordability issues in the Irish housing market are 
growing over time. The relatively high rates on borrowing faced by Irish 
homeowners are likely to exacerbate these affordability challenges. 
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FIGURE 22 INTEREST RATES ON NEW HOUSE PURCHASE LOANS TO HOUSEHOLDS, EURO AREA 
COMPARISON (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, SME Credit Series, Table A.14.1. 
Notes:  Countries included are: AT, BE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, NL, PT, SI. These countries are selected due to data availability. Data 
differ between this chart presented and the text as the ECB comparison data include restructured mortgages whereas the 
new business SVR is only for new drawdowns. 
 
Interest rates on loans to corporations are also higher in Ireland than in the Euro 
Area. Figure 23 presents the interest rates on new business loans for Non-
Financial Corporations in Ireland as well as the median rate for the Eurozone. As 
of September 2019 there was a 1.8 percentage point difference in the rate paid 
by Irish and Euro Area businesses. This difference was even larger for business 
loans worth less than €250,000, which are used as a proxy for loans to SMEs. For 
small loans the rate of interest paid by Irish business was 3.6 percentage points 
greater than the rest of the Euro Area.  
 
While the interest rate on corporate loans in the Euro Area has been decreasing 
since 2014, a similar trend is not observed in Ireland. From June 2019 there is a 
clear increase in the average interest rate charged on corporate loans in Ireland. 
This likely reflects the increased likelihood of a No-Deal Brexit at this time. Given 
the close economic ties of the Irish and UK economies, a No-Deal Brexit would 
likely have a significant negative impact on Irish business and this is reflected in 
the increased cost of financing over this period.  
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FIGURE 23 INTEREST RATES ON NEW CORPORATE LOANS, EURO AREA COMPARISON (%) 
 
 
Source:  ECB MFI data. Small loans refer to loans worth less than €250,000. 
 
Inflation outlook 
Figure 24 presents the inflation rate in Ireland using the CPI, the CPI excluding 
energy and unprocessed foods (core inflation), and the HICP.11 Despite an 
environment of low unemployment and increasing earnings, price inflation has 
been relatively subdued through 2019. In October 2019, the 12-month inflation 
rate was 0.7 per cent for the CPI and 0.6 per cent for the HICP. Core inflation, 
which does not include energy prices or unprocessed food, increased by 1.1 per 
cent over this period. Over the same period there were increases in the prices of 
education (+4.6 per cent), housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels  
(+3.2 per cent), alcoholic beverages and tobacco (+2.7 per cent), and restaurants 
and hotels (+2.6 per cent). Elsewhere, sectors which experienced deflation over 
the 12-month period were communications (-6.5 per cent), clothing and footwear  
(-2.5 per cent), furnishings, household equipment and routine household 
maintenance (-2.1 per cent), food and non-alcoholic beverages (-1.1 per cent), 
and transport (-0.9 per cent).  
 
 
                                                          
 
11  HICP refers to the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices. This is an index of consumer prices designed to provide a 
standardised measure of inflation across European countries. Methodological differences between the HICP and Irish 
CPI lead to small discrepancies between both measures.  
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FIGURE 24 ANNUAL GROWTH IN INFLATION (%)  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Typically as unemployment falls and earnings increase, firms will put up prices in 
order to keep up with rising costs. This should lead to an increase in inflation, 
which is why prices are expected to rise during an expansionary economic period. 
Given the strong performance of the Irish labour market in recent years and the 
associated increase in earnings, we would expect to see some significant price 
growth over this time. However, inflation has remained relatively subdued, 
averaging just 0.9 per cent in 2019. Persistently low inflation has become 
something of a phenomenon globally, resistant even to unprecedented levels of 
accommodative monetary policy. A number of reasons have been put forward in 
order to try and explain why prices have remained so low.  
 
Figure 25 shows the inflation rate for Ireland broken down into goods and 
services. While inflation in services has been trending upwards since the start of 
2018, for goods the opposite is true. A number of factors may explain the 
difference in price growth between goods and services. These include a greater 
level of competition in the goods sector, which has been enhanced by increased 
globalisation and international trade. There has also been a faster rate of growth 
in labour productivity in manufacturing relative to market services over the past 
number of decades.12  Another reason for the low price growth of goods may be 
the weak value of GBP over the last number of years. This is known as exchange 
rate pass-through and is a measure of the extent to which cheaper import prices 
 
                                                          
 
12  For further discussion see Ferrara, L. (2019). ‘What is behind the change in the gap between services price inflation 
and goods price inflation?’, Economic Bulletin, Issue 5, ECB, 2019. 
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are passed on to consumers when the domestic currency increases in value 
relative to the origin country.13 
 
FIGURE 25 DECOMPOSITION OF ANNUAL CPI GROWTH INTO GOODS AND SERVICES  
GROWTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Inflation is expected to increase next year as the labour market and earnings 
improve. Consumer prices are expected to rise by 1.0 per cent in 2019, followed 
by a 1.2 per cent increase in 2020.  
 
DEMAND 
Household sector consumption  
Key findings: 
• Consumption growth slowed in Q2 2019 but remains high in an 
international context; 
• Rising incomes and low unemployment are providing a supportive context 
for housing spending; 
• Consumer sentiment continued to decline in Q3 2019 on the back of Brexit 
and international uncertainties. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
13  For more on this see: Allen-Coghlan, Matthew ‘Exchange rate pass-through – EUR/GBP’, Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, Autumn 2019, ESRI. 
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According to the latest quarterly National Accounts, personal consumption 
expenditure increased by 2.6 per cent year-on-year in Q2 2019. This represents a 
decrease in the pace of growth from Q1 2019. A moderation in the pace of 
spending growth by households may be correlated with greater uncertainty at 
the household level. While the labour market has continued to perform strongly 
with low unemployment and rising real incomes, uncertainty particularly around 
the Brexit issue is likely to be diminishing households’ risk appetite.  
 
FIGURE 26  QUARTERLY PERSONAL CONSUMPTION ON GOODS AND SERVICES – CONSTANT 
MARKET PRICES AND SEASONALLY ADJUSTED 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
However, consumption growth in Ireland is high in an international context, in 
particular relative to other European economies (Figure 27). For example in 
Q2 2019, the growth rate of consumption for the preceding four quarters was 
twice that of any other country presented including the UK, France and Germany.  
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FIGURE 27  QUARTERLY PERSONAL CONSUMPTION IN SELECTED ECONOMIES –  
FOUR-QUARTER ROLLING AVERAGE OF ANNUALISED GROWTH RATES (%) 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat, Final expenditure of households, non-seasonally adjusted, chain linked volumes percentage change on the same 
period one year previous. Figures present a four-quarter rolling average.  
 
To get an insight into what is driving household spending patterns we draw on 
detailed retail sales data. The retail sales is an important input into understanding 
household behaviour as it measures actual spending and is available in a timely 
manner. Table 1 presents the annual growth in retail sales volume for select 
items for the three months to September 2019. The third quarter information on 
retail sales gives a more up-to-date picture than the Q2 National Accounts data.  
 
Relative to the data presented in our previous Commentary, there has been some 
increase in retail sales in the three months to September 2019. Overall retail sales 
rose by just over half a per cent. Sales in the retail business index excluding motor 
trade rose by over 4 per cent. Again, sales of furniture and lighting goods grew 
considerably, up 8.39 per cent year-on-year, which is likely due to the strong 
growth in housing market activity. There was a further 6.5 per cent fall in retail 
sales from department stores which highlights the ongoing struggle of traditional 
retailers in the current environment, for example from online competition.    
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TABLE 1 GROWTH IN SELECT RETAIL SALES (VOLUME) ITEMS (THREE MONTHS TO  
SEPTEMBER 2019) 
Retail Business – NACE REV 2 Volume of Sales 
 Annual % change 
Motor Trades -5.2 
Non-specialised stores (excluding department stores) 5.6 
Department stores -6.5 
Clothing, Footwear and Textiles 1.5 
Furniture and lighting 8.4 
All retail businesses 0.6 
All retail businesses, excluding motor trades 4.2 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The overall trends in retail sales are displayed in Figure 28. This chart presents a 
three-month rolling average of the annual growth of total retail sales, sales 
excluding the motor trade, and sales for household equipment. The most recent 
data up to September 2019 point towards an increase in retail sales. The fact that 
this increase coincided with one of the most uncertain times with respect to the 
UK’s exit from the European Union is surprising.  
 
FIGURE 28 ANNUAL GROWTH (%) IN RETAIL SALES INDEX VOLUME ADJUSTED  
(BASE 2005=100), THREE-MONTH ROLLING AVERAGE 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Another important indicator which provides insight into household spending is 
consumer sentiment. Figure 29 presents an index developed using the European 
Commission data on consumer sentiment. The figure presents data for Ireland, 
the UK and the rest of the EU to provide context.  
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As noted in the previous Commentary, the initial Brexit delay from the end of 
March deadline resulted in an increase in sentiment in April 2019 but this was 
short-lived. Throughout the summer and into autumn, consumer sentiment in 
Ireland has continued to fall. This is in stark contrast to the increase in retail sales 
that is observed in August and September and highlights the apparent breakdown 
in the correlation of household spending and consumer sentiment highlighted in 
the Summer 2019 Commentary.  
 
FIGURE 29 CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDICATORS – IRELAND, UK AND REST OF EU 
 
 
Source:  European Commission data and ESRI calculation.  
Note:  The positive/negative balances from the EU COF series are transformed by adding 100. We then set the base to 100 in 
January 2010 with growth relative to this point i.e. ((Yt/YJan2010) -1)*100.  
 
Given the risk of a No-Deal Brexit in the period prior to the agreement of the 
current revised Withdrawal Agreement, it is unsurprising that households would 
have viewed the economic outlook with caution. With the signing of the revisited 
arrangement and the additional extension, it is likely the risk of a No-Deal Brexit 
has receded in the short term. This may result in a recovery in consumer 
sentiment towards the end of 2019. In this regard, we forecast consumption 
growth of 2.7 per cent in 2019 and 2.5 per cent in 2020.  
 
Property market developments 
Key Points: 
• General decline in national property price growth continues; 
• Property price growth in Dublin turns negative, falling by 1.3 per cent in 
September;  
• Rents continue to grow strongly with the RTB National Rent Index growing 
by 7 per cent annually in Q2 2019. 
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The general decline in national property price growth noted in the previous 
Commentary (Autumn 2019) has continued. This recent downward trend began in 
mid-2018 and property price growth remains at its lowest point since mid-2013. 
Figure 30 shows the year-on-year change in residential property prices by 
property type. In September 2019, the annualised growth rate in the price of all 
residential properties stood at 1.1 per cent, down from 8.3 per cent in September 
2018.  
 
Examining the price growth of houses and apartments separately shows that 
apartment price growth has seen the most dramatic deceleration so far in 2019, 
falling from 7.2 per cent in January to 0.6 per cent in September. The growth rate 
of house prices has fallen from 5 per cent to 1.1 per cent over the same period. 
The reasons behind the deceleration in residential property price growth likely 
include the increased level of housing completions and the affordability 
constraints stemming from the mortgage lending limits set by the Central Bank of 
Ireland.  
 
FIGURE 30 ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PRICE GROWTH BY DWELLING (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
The national trend in property prices hides regional variation in the behaviour of 
residential property prices. Comparing Dublin to the rest of the country 
(Figure 31), it is clear that the fall in property price growth is much more acute in 
Dublin than elsewhere. Property price growth outside of Dublin has remained 
positive, falling from 7.8 per cent in January to 3.6 per cent in September 2019. 
However since August 2019, property price growth in Dublin has been negative. 
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The growth rate of property prices in Dublin has declined from 2.7 per cent in 
January 2019 to -1.3 per cent in September. This is 7.7 percentage points lower 
than the growth rate in September 2018. The 0.4 per cent fall in Dublin’s 
residential property prices in August 2019 marks the first price decline since 
October 2012. 
 
In the short term, such a modest fall in Dublin property prices will do little to 
assuage concerns about the affordability of housing for buyers in the area. Recent 
work by Allen-Coghlan et al. (2019a) highlights the challenges faced by first time 
buyers in terms of housing affordability in Dublin.14 They find that first time 
buyers in Dublin and the surrounding counties face mortgage repayment-to-
income (MRTI) ratios that far exceeded those faced by first time buyers in other 
counties. Coupled with evidence from Gaffney (2019) and Kelly and Mazza (2019), 
it is highly likely that Dublin house prices are affected by borrowing constraints 
becoming more binding.  
 
FIGURE 31 ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PRICE GROWTH BY REGION (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
The RTB National Rent Index indicates that rents, nationally, grew by 7 per cent in 
Q2 2019 compared to the same period the previous year. This is broadly 
consistent with expectations given that the growth rate of the National Rent 
 
                                                          
 
14  Allen-Coghlan, Matthew, Conor Judge, Conor O’Toole, Rachel Slaymaker (2019a). A County Level Perspective on 
Housing Affordability in Ireland. ESRI Research Note. 
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Index has been between 6.5 and 8.2 per cent since the final quarter of 2016. The 
growth rate of the RTB National Rent Index, as well as that of the RTB regional 
rent index for Dublin, the GDA and outside of the GDA, are presented in 
Figure 32. Rents in the GDA and outside of the GDA grew by 6.8 per cent and  
7.7 per cent respectively, while rents in Dublin grew by 7.1 per cent year-on-year 
in Q2 2019. In Q2 2018 rents grew by 9.2, 6.7 and 5.1 per cent year-on-year in 
Dublin, outside the GDA and in the GDA respectively. Thus, when comparing 
Q2 2019 to the same quarter a year previous, a relative convergence in the 
growth rate of rent across the regions is evident.  
 
Combining data on rent and house prices from 2010 to 2018, Allen-Coghlan et al. 
(2019b) explore trends in the rent-to-house-price ratio in Ireland in order to 
provide insights into price sustainability and how the housing market is 
developing across the country’s regions. They find that the Irish housing market is 
not overvalued from a user cost perspective and that overall the market appears 
to be well explained by fundamentals. However, the Note does point out the 
variation observed across the country in key housing variables over the period 
2013-2018.15 
 
FIGURE 32 RTB RENT INDEX – NATIONAL, DUBLIN, GDA AND OUTSIDE GDA YEAR-ON-YEAR 
GROWTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  Residential Tenancies Board (RTB). 
 
                                                          
 
15  Allen-Coghlan, Matthew, Kieran McQuinn, Conor O’Toole. (2019b). Assessing Price Sustainability in the Irish Housing 
Market: A County-Level Analysis. ESRI Research Note. 
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SUPPLY 
Investment overview 
Key Points: 
• Business sentiment deteriorated through 2019;  
• Uncertainty likely dragging on investment in machinery and equipment;  
• Construction investment remains strong, despite Q2 slowdown in growth. 
 
 
Within recent Commentaries, we have noted the high correlation between 
investment and uncertainty and examined the impact of Brexit and other 
international economic challenges on investment decisions taken in the Irish 
economy. Indeed, previous work by O’Toole (2019) in the Summer 2019 
Commentary noted the correlation between policy uncertainty in the US and 
investment in Ireland: capital accumulation amongst US companies operating in 
the Irish economy appears to be strongly correlated with policy uncertainty in the 
US economy.  
 
It is not always possible to identify changes in investment linked to economic 
fundamentals in Ireland using National Accounts data, given the divergence 
between the headline level of investment in the economy and the underlying 
fundamental rate.  
 
The latest quarterly National Accounts (Q2 2019) provide a good example of the 
incredible impact of globalisation effects on Irish investment, as capital 
accumulation increased by over 220 per cent relative to Q2 2018. These effects 
are staggering, however their initial impact on GDP is limited as capital imports 
offset the investment flows. Figure 33 shows the correlation between investment 
in aircraft leasing from the quarterly National Accounts and imports of other 
transport equipment (where inflows of aircraft leasing capital shows up in the 
trade statistics). This demonstrates the offsetting GDP impact.  
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FIGURE 33 IMPORT AND INVESTMENT DATA FOR AIRCRAFT LEASING, YEAR-ON-YEAR (%) 
 
 
Sources:  CSO and QEC analysis.  
 
To strip out these effects and focus on underlying activity, and to better 
understand the impact of economic factors on investment, we consult a number 
of data sources. Figure 34 presents the trend in the CSO’s modified investment 
which excludes the aircraft leasing and IP investment activity. Based on these 
data, investment has increased by 1.7 per cent year-on-year to Q2 2019 which 
was an increase from the previous quarter. It is not possible to provide insight 
into the subcomponents of machinery and equipment and intangibles as the 
figures have been redacted. However, construction activity is available and this 
category has continued to grow at 5.6 per cent year-on-year to Q2 2019. This 
represents a slowdown in construction investment which has continued from the 
first quarter. More details on construction investment are presented below.  
 
FIGURE 34 GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION GROWTH, YEAR-ON-YEAR (%) 
 
 
Sources:  CSO and QEC analysis.  
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The growth rates for modified investment are presented in Figure 34. As noted it 
is not possible to extrapolate the growth rate for Q2 2019 for machinery and 
equipment and intangibles due to redactions. Looking back since early 2018, it is 
clear there has been a slowdown in the rate of investment growth both overall, 
but particularly in machinery and equipment and construction activity. The fall in 
machinery and equipment investment is unsurprising as O’Toole (2019) showed 
that investment in these assets is very sensitive to uncertainty.  
 
FIGURE 35 GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION GROWTH, YEAR-ON-YEAR (%) 
 
 
Sources:  CSO and QEC analysis.  
 
To provide further detail on the slowdown in machinery and equipment 
investment, a more granular review can be undertaken by focusing on the Irish 
import data. As a small open economy with relatively few traditional 
manufacturing activities, it is often the case that most investment assets are 
imported. Import data can therefore be used to gauge investment flows. 
Figure 36 presents the trend growth rate in selected machinery imports. The 
trend growth is a simple six-month moving average, used for smoothing purposes 
given the considerable volatility in the monthly data.  
 
It is clear that imports of capital machinery picked up in mid- to late-2018, 
however the recent trend shows a deterioration across the majority of assets. 
This provides further evidence of the likely drag that global uncertainty is having 
on capital formation. Declines were particularly strong in a number of sectors 
including metal working machinery, office machines and automated data 
processing equipment and specialised industrial machinery.   
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FIGURE 36  IMPORTS OF MACHINERY INTO IRELAND – TREND GROWTH RATES – SIX-MONTH 
MOVING AVERAGE, YEAR-ON-YEAR (%) 
 
 
Sources:  CSO and QEC analysis.  
 
Business sentiment 
To gain more insight into the degree to which businesses are being affected by 
uncertainty, we draw on the European Commission Business Confidence 
Indicators. The overall confidence indicator for Ireland and the average for the 
European Union are presented in Figure 37. This indicator is the average of the 
positive/negative survey response balance to three sub-questions on the order 
book levels, stock holdings and production expectations over the coming three 
months. Positive numbers indicate that more companies view an improvement in 
conditions while negative numbers indicate a worsening in the economic outlook.  
 
While Ireland posts more favourable conditions than those in the EU, it is clear 
that since December 2018 there has been a reduction in the number of 
companies viewing the outlook positively. This has occurred concurrently with a 
similar trend for the EU as a whole but is far more pronounced in Ireland. It is 
likely that such a reduction in confidence is weighing on investment spending. 
The most recent data for September and October have continued to decline 
indicating that Irish companies are becoming increasing uneasy about the 
business climate.  
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FIGURE 37 EUROPEAN COMMISSION BUSINESS CONFIDENCE INDICATOR  
 
 
Source:  European Commission.  
 
A more granular review of the specific concerns of companies can be gleaned 
from considering the sub-indices which are built into the overall confidence 
indicator. Figure 38 presents the trend in the sub-indices covering the following 
issues: production trends, assessment of the order book levels, assessment of the 
export order book levels, production expectations and employment expectations. 
The interpretation of these indicators is identical to that for the headline metric. 
However, we present a three-month moving average to remove some of the 
short-term volatility.  
 
It is clear that the deterioration in sentiment noted in the previous Commentary 
has worsened, with views on order books, export orders and employment all 
declining.  
 
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Ju
n-
16
Au
g-
16
O
ct
-1
6
De
c-
16
Fe
b-
17
Ap
r-
17
Ju
n-
17
Au
g-
17
O
ct
-1
7
De
c-
17
Fe
b-
18
Ap
r-
18
Ju
n-
18
Au
g-
18
O
ct
-1
8
De
c-
18
Fe
b-
19
Ap
r-
19
Ju
n-
19
Au
g-
19
O
ct
-1
9
European Union Ireland
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  W i nt er  201 9  |  43  
FIGURE 38 ROLLING AVERAGE FOR INDIVIDUAL ITEMS FROM EC BUSINESS SENTIMENT FOR 
IRELAND  
 
 
Sources:  QEC analysis of EC data.  
 
Construction outlook 
The National Accounts data to Q2 2019 highlighted a fall in the growth rate of 
construction investment to 5.6 per cent. As housing completion numbers come 
out ahead of the National Accounts, this was flagged in our previous 
Commentary. To provide the most up-to-date assessment, Figure 39 presents the 
trend in housing completions on a quarterly basis over the period Q1 2012 to 
Q3 2019. The latest figure for Q3 2019 indicates that nearly 5,700 units were 
completed for the quarter, with circa 14,700 units being built for the year to date. 
This represents an acceleration of 20 per cent on an annualised basis.  
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FIGURE 39 HOUSING COMPLETIONS – QUARTERLY LEVEL AND YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH 
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
On the back of the higher growth in Q3 2019, we have increased our forecast for 
housing units in 2019 marginally to 21,500 units. Maintaining the growth rate into 
2020 suggests a completions level of just over 24,500 units next year (Figure 40). 
However, should any adverse economic shock occur, for example from a hard 
Brexit, this may reduce the growth rate in completions next year.  
 
FIGURE 40 HOUSING COMPLETIONS – QUARTERLY LEVEL AND YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH 
 
 
Sources:  CSO and QEC Forecasts. 
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Forecasts 
As global risk factors and the Brexit negotiations continue to weigh on business 
planning, we have moderated our investment outlook for 2019 and 2020. 
However, if the rebound in growth in construction activity is sustained and public 
investment continues apace, these factors will provide a stimulus to investment. 
Overall, due to distortionary multinational activity we expect annual average 
growth in investment of 45.0 per cent in 2019 and 4.7 per cent in 2020.  
 
LABOUR MARKET 
Unemployment 
Key Points: 
• Unemployment rate falls below 5 per cent for the first time since 2007;  
• Employment rises by 2.4 per cent in the year to Q3 2019 with 2,326,900 
people at work;  
• Average weekly earnings increased by 4 per cent annually in Q3 2019. 
 
 
The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate (Figure 41) has continued to decline 
and was 4.8 per cent as of October 2019. The unemployment rate dropped below 
5 per cent in August of this year (after the CSO revised previous estimates). This is 
the lowest unemployment rate recorded in over 12 years – since January 2007. 
The current rate is down from 5.7 per cent in October 2018 and down from  
11.1 per cent in October 2014. Although the rate may decline further in the near 
future, as the economy is nearing full employment any such declines are likely to 
be small. This is because a substantial proportion of the unemployment that 
remains is likely to be structural in nature and thus not unduly influenced by the 
business cycle.  
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FIGURE 41 SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY MONTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  Monthly Unemployment Series, Central Statistics Office. 
 
The Live Register provides a monthly series on the number of people registered 
for Jobseekers Benefit, Jobseekers Allowance and those registered for various 
other statutory entitlements from the Irish Department of Employment Affairs 
and Social Protection. It is one of the most up-to-date labour market measures 
produced by the CSO. While it is not a perfect measure of unemployment, as it 
includes part-time, casual and seasonal workers, it does capture important trends 
that exist in the Irish labour market. Figure 42 depicts the number of people on 
the Live Register, by age, from February 2007 to October 2019. In October 2019 
there were 188,700 people on the Live Register – the lowest level since early 
2008. Of those on the register, 168,700 were 25 or older, while 20,000 were 
under 25. As of October 2019, there were 17,300 less people 25 or older on the 
Live Register compared to the same period the previous year and 2,200 less 
people below the age of 25. In total there were 19,500 fewer people on the Live 
Register in October 2019 compared to October 2018, a 9.9 per cent reduction.  
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FIGURE 42 NUMBERS (‘000) ON THE LIVE REGISTER BY AGE (SEASONALLY ADJUSTED)  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Table 2 shows the number and proportion of those on the Live Register broken 
down by duration. The number of long-term unemployed, those out of work for a 
period greater than 12 months, has fallen by 59.5 per cent in the five years 
between October 2014 and October 2019. The proportion of those on the Live 
Register for a period greater than 12 months now stands at 38.6 per cent, down 
from 47.6 per cent in October 2014. These are positive developments, as the 
longer an individual is out of work the more difficult it can be for that person to 
re-enter the workforce. The reasons for this include the atrophy of skills during 
unemployment, a fall in individuals’ morale and a stigma among employers 
towards those who are long-term unemployed.16 The proportion of people on the 
Live Register for a period of less than a year has increased from 52.4 per cent to 
61.7 per cent over the same period. This implies that over the last five years an 
increasing number of people are able to find a job within their first 12 months of 
being unemployed.  
 
 
                                                          
 
16  Bjørsted, Erik, Elva Bova and Signe Dahl (2016). ‘Lessons Learnt from the Nordics: How to Fight Long-term 
Unemployment’, Intereconomics. Vol. 51, Issue 3, p.172-178. 
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TABLE 2 NUMBER AND PROPORTION OF PEOPLE ON THE LIVE REGISTER BY DURATION 
  2014 M10 2018 M10 2019 M10 
  (‘000) % (‘000) % (‘000) % 
All durations 358.1  199.2  180.5  
Under 1 year 187.4 52.3 116.2 58.3 111.4 61.7 
1 year and over 170.7 47.7 83.0 41.7 69.1 38.3 
1 year – less than 2 years 46.3 12.9 22.3 11.2 19.1 10.6 
2 years – less than 3 years 28.6 8.0 12.9 6.5 11.1 6.1 
3 years and over 95.8 26.8 47.8 24.0 38.9 21.6 
 
Source:  Live Register, Central Statistics Office. 
 
Table 3 shows the number people on the Live Register categorised with respect 
to the last occupation held. The number of people on the Live Register fell across 
all the occupational categories in the 12 months from October 2018 to October 
2019. Of those on the Live Register in October 2019, 16.6 per cent worked in 
‘craft and related’ occupations prior to being out of work. This represents the 
largest single occupational class and includes occupations such as; bricklayers, 
carpenters, plumbers, blacksmiths, butchers and bakers.17 However, there has 
been a significant decline in the number of people from this occupational class on 
the Live Register over this period. Those who previously worked in ‘associate 
professional and technical’ occupations were the smallest occupational group, 
making up just 3.5 per cent of those on the Live Register in October 2019. 
Examples of the type of occupations that fall into this category include; dental 
assistants, bookkeepers, estate agents, legal secretaries, photographers and chefs 
among others. In percentage terms, the largest reductions were in the ‘sales’ and 
the ‘plant and machine operatives’ occupational classes. The former falling by 
15.2 per cent and the latter by 13.2 per cent over those 12 months. 
 
 
                                                          
 
17  International Labour Office (ILO) (2012) International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08), Vol. 1. 
Geneva: International Labour Office (ILO). Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_172572.pdf 
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TABLE 3 PERSONS (‘000) ON THE LIVE REGISTER CLASSIFIED BY LAST OCCUPATION HELD 
Sector 2018 M10 2019 M10 % Change Unit Change 
Managers and administrators 10.33 9.61 -7.0 -0.72 
Professional 12.45 11.97 -3.9 -0.48 
Associate professional and technical 6.93 6.38 -7.9 -0.55 
Clerical and secretarial 21.59 21.07 -2.4 -0.52 
Craft and related 33.58 29.94 -10.8 -3.64 
Personal and protective services 25.94 23.17 -10.7 -2.77 
Sales 20.53 17.41 -15.2 -3.12 
Plant and machine operatives 30.75 26.70 -13.2 -4.05 
Other broad occupational groups 24.67 22.59 -8.4 -2.08 
No occupation 12.49 11.60 -7.1 -0.89 
 
Source:  Live Register, Central Statistics Office. 
 
Employment 
In Q3 2019 there were 53,700 more people in employment than in Q3 2018, a  
2.4 per cent increase. This is in line with expectations as the growth rate of 
employment has been greater than or equal to 2 per cent since Q2 2013. The 
employment growth rate for Q3 2019 marks a slight increase on the 2 per cent 
growth rate experienced in the year to Q2 2019. However, it still represents a 
lower level of employment growth than that witnessed between Q1 2015 and 
Q4 2017. During this period employment growth never fell below 3 per cent. The 
slowdown in employment growth rates may be connected to international 
uncertainty in recent times. While uncertainty stemming from the United 
Kingdom’s exit from the European Union may have alleviated slightly in the short 
run, a degree of international uncertainty remains present. However, as the 
economy moves closer to full employment the growth rate of employment will 
inevitably be lower than that witnessed during the economic recovery period.  
 
Figure 43 shows the number of people in full-time and part-time employment in 
Ireland between Q3 2006 and Q3 2019. As of Q3 2019 there are now 1,853,400 
people working in full-time employment. This is an increase of 2.2 per cent 
compared to Q3 2018. Those working full-time represent about 80 per cent of all 
workers. The number of people working part-time in Q3 2019 increased by 
11,500 to 473,500 people. This represents an increase of 2.9 per cent compared 
to the same quarter a year previous. Interestingly, the number of people who are 
part-time underemployed, which measures the number of people working part-
time that have a desire to work more hours, increased by 0.3 per cent in the year 
to Q3 2019. In all, total employment in the State stood at 2,326,900 people as of 
Q3 2019.  
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FIGURE 43  SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED EMPLOYMENT, FULL-TIME AND PART-TIME (‘000) 
 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office. 
 
The increase in employment has been spread across a broad range of sectors. 
Figure 44 shows the growth in the seasonally-adjusted level of employment by 
sector. Employment in the construction sector has continued to rise from its nadir 
in 2013, increasing by 84.5 per cent between Q1 2013 and Q3 2019. Employment 
in the information and communication and the industry sectors has also 
continued to increase, rising by approximately 45 per cent and 12 per cent 
respectively over the ten years in question. As of Q3 2019, there are also about 
21 per cent more people engaged in ‘professional, scientific and technical’ 
activities compared to Q3 2009, while the number of people working in ‘finance, 
insurance and real estate’ has recovered to just above parity with its Q3 2009 
level. Of the sectors presented, only agriculture, forestry and fishing is below its 
Q3 2009 level a decade on.  
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FIGURE 44 SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR (INDEXED USING Q3 2009 AS BASE) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Figure 45 shows the number of people aged 15 years and over in employment by 
region indexed against Q3 2012. In the seven years that followed Q3 2012, 
employment increased by just over 21 per cent in the Northern and Western 
Region and by approximately 17 per cent in the Southern Region. Over the same 
period, employment rose by just over 26 per cent in the Eastern and Midlands 
Region (excluding Dublin). The largest percentage increase was in Dublin itself 
which experienced a 30 per cent increase in employment during this period.  
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FIGURE 45  EMPLOYMENT BY REGION (INDEXED USING Q3 2012 AS A BASE) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Earnings 
Figure 46 shows seasonally-adjusted Average Hourly Earnings and seasonally-
adjusted Average Weekly Earnings for the decade between Q3 2009 and 
Q3 2019. In Q3 2019 seasonally-adjusted Average Hourly Earnings were €24.10, 
an increase of 3.84 per cent year-on-year. This marks the ninth consecutive 
quarter that seasonally-adjusted Average Hourly Earnings have grown by more 
than 2 per cent year-on-year. As of Q3 2019 seasonally-adjusted Average Weekly 
Earnings were €780.80, a 4 per cent increase year-on-year. This represents a 
continuation in the strong growth of labour earning witnessed in recent times. 
Overall, with such low unemployment, wage growth is expected to continue as 
employees tend to have more bargaining power in a tight labour market. 
Furthermore, with inflation at its current levels, most of this wage growth has 
translated into real wage growth and so consumers will have more to spend.   
 
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
20
12
Q
3
20
12
Q
4
20
13
Q
1
20
13
Q
2
20
13
Q
3
20
13
Q
4
20
14
Q
1
20
14
Q
2
20
14
Q
3
20
14
Q
4
20
15
Q
1
20
15
Q
2
20
15
Q
3
20
15
Q
4
20
16
Q
1
20
16
Q
2
20
16
Q
3
20
16
Q
4
20
17
Q
1
20
17
Q
2
20
17
Q
3
20
17
Q
4
20
18
Q
1
20
18
Q
2
20
18
Q
3
20
18
Q
4
20
19
Q
1
20
19
Q
2
20
19
Q
3
Northern and Western Southern Dublin Eastern and Midlands (Exc. Dublin)
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  W i nt er  201 9  |  53  
FIGURE 46  SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED AVERAGE HOURLY AND AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS 
 
 
Source:  Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey, Central Statistics Office.  
Note:  The y-axis on the LHS has a very low range of values.  
 
 
Labour market forecasts 
Given the strong performance of the Irish economy thus far in 2019 we expect 
the average unemployment rate for the year to be 5 per cent. In the absence of 
shocks, we expect the unemployment rate to further improve to 4.6 per cent in 
2020. Employment levels are expected to average 2.31 million for 2019 and to 
reach 2.35 million in 2020. As the labour market continues to get tighter, we 
expect nominal earnings growth to average 3.5 per cent for 2019 and 4.0 per cent 
for 2020.  
 
PUBLIC FINANCES 
Key Points: 
• Majority of tax categories see strong growth; 
• Corporation tax likely to register another year of strong growth;  
• Box illustrates the impact of a collapse in windfall element of corporation 
taxes; 
• Budget 2020 mainly prudent in its objectives. 
 
 
Irish taxation revenue is set to register strong growth in 2019 indicating that the 
underlying economy continues to perform well despite the presence of Brexit and 
the likelihood of a global economic slowdown. From Figure 47 it can be seen that 
all of the major taxation items for the year to date have shown significant 
increases in year-on-year returns. 
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FIGURE 47 ANNUAL CHANGES IN MAJOR TAX SUB-COMPONENTS (%): JANUARY TO 
NOVEMBER  
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
Income tax receipts for the year to date are up by 8.2 per cent on the previous 
year, while pay related social insurance receipts are up by 5.3 per cent on the 
previous year. Increases in both these tax receipts along with the continued 
robust performance of the Irish labour market demonstrates the underlying 
resilience of the Irish economy. 
 
Interestingly, corporation tax is also experiencing an increase of nearly 6 per cent 
for the year to date. This follows a substantial increase in 2018. Figure 48 
presents the average annual growth rate in all the major tax headings over the 
period 2012 to 2018. 
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FIGURE 48 AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE IN MAJOR TAX HEADINGS % (2012 TO 2018)  
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
It is clear from the graph that corporation taxes have experienced a much more 
significant increase compared to the other tax headings particularly when 
compared with income taxes and VAT. Figure 49 compares the share of total 
taxation receipts for the major components: income tax, VAT, corporation tax 
and excise duty for 2012 and 2019.18 
 
FIGURE 49 COMPARISON OF THE SHARES OF DIFFERENT TAXATION COMPONENTS (%)  
2012 AND 2019  
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
                                                          
 
18  The 2019 figure is for the period January to October. 
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Of the major headings, corporation tax has shown the largest increase in relative 
importance going from 11.5 per cent of the total receipts in 2012 to over 18.5 per 
cent in 2019. Inevitably, the persistent, sharp increase in recent corporation 
returns has given rise to the concern that some element of the increase may be 
unsustainable or be a ‘windfall’ in nature.19 If that is the case, then that 
unsustainable element of the returns should not be used to fund current 
expenditure. Varthalitis, in Box 2, uses a recently developed dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) model to assess the potential implications of a 
collapse in these windfall returns on the public finances generally. 
 
BOX 2 WHAT HAPPENS IF THERE IS A REDUCTION IN THE WINDFALL COMPONENT OF 
CORPORATION TAXES? 
Since 2012, corporate tax (CT) revenues in Ireland have witnessed a sizeable increase 
both in nominal levels and as a share of total revenues. In total, CT receipts have grown 
by 146 per cent between 2012 and 2018 from €4.3 billion to €10.4 billion. This has 
resulted in CT receipts becoming the third largest source of tax revenues in Ireland. 
CT revenues are inherently more volatile in a small and remarkably open economy such 
as the Irish case, where these structural characteristics make Ireland’s CT revenues more 
prone to changes in international economic conditions. Over the last couple of years  
CT outturns have consistently outperformed official budget forecasts (see e.g. IFAC, 2018 
and Conefrey et al., 2019). Perhaps more importantly, various model-based projections 
suggest that Ireland’s economic fundamentals might not be able to fully explain this 
exceptional growth in CT revenues (see e.g. McGuinness and Smyth, 2019 and Box D in 
IFAC, 2019a). For example, a recent analysis by IFAC estimates the unexplained amount 
of CT receipts to be within a range from €3 billion to €6 billion in 2018 (see Box D in  
IFAC, 2019a). 
While a large share of CT recent growth can be attributed to Ireland’s economic 
performance, there are some concerns that a significant share may constitute a 
temporary increase or ‘windfall’ element of Government’s revenues and thus this 
element may be unsustainable in the longer term. In the latter case, a sudden and 
persistent fall of these ‘windfall’ revenues poses a potential fiscal risk. A fiscal gap would 
emerge with fiscal and macroeconomic repercussions for the Irish economy. 
The aim of this Box is to assess the fiscal and macroeconomic implications for the Irish 
economy of such fiscal risks. We do this by employing a dynamic general equilibrium 
macroeconomic model for Ireland that has been recently developed in the ESRI (FIR-
GEM; for more details see Varthalitis, 2019). To quantify the effects on fiscal/macro 
aggregates we simulate in FIR-GEM fiscal scenarios that simulate a decline in the windfall 
component of CT receipts. We achieve this by implementing a series of fiscal shocks 
 
                                                          
 
19  The windfall element of corporation tax returns has been recognised by the Department of Finance. See for example: 
Budget 2020: Addressing Fiscal Vulnerabilities, Department of Finance. 
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exogenous to the Irish economy. This is because any reversal in the CT windfall is likely to 
be related to firm-specific decisions of a small number of foreign-owned firms and/or 
other external shocks.  
We consider two fiscal scenarios, namely a ‘moderate’ decline and a ‘sharp’ decline in tax 
revenues. In the ‘moderate’ scenario revenues drop by €2 billion below their expected 
trend in the impact year; while in the ‘sharp’ scenario they decline by €6 billion (these 
estimates are taken from IFAC, 2019b). We contrast these scenarios with a baseline 
scenario in which all variables grow at their assumed pre-shock trend. The CT revenue 
shock in both scenarios is assumed to be persistent, meaning that the associated receipts 
are expected to remain below their baseline trend for several years after the shock. 
Our scope is to isolate the fiscal effect of a sudden drop in revenues, and thus, we 
abstract from any other external shock (e.g. Brexit); furthermore we assume that 
policymakers do not implement discretionary fiscal measures to react to this fiscal gap; 
instead all the key tax-spending instruments remain constant at their baseline values. As 
our point of departure we choose the latest year for which we have outturn data, i.e. 
2018. This assumption is not restrictive as our model-based analysis can be extended 
forward to any arbitrary year. 
Figure C presents total tax revenues in billions. If the fiscal shock occurs, tax revenues 
would grow slower in the ‘moderate’ scenario or fall significantly in the ‘sharp’ scenario. 
Tax revenues would remain below their baseline over the coming years in both scenarios. 
The difference can be thought of as the fiscal gap that would emerge in the public 
finances due to a collapse in the windfall element of CT receipts. Figure D presents the 
dynamic responses of the debt- and deficit-to-GDP ratios, the 10-year government bonds 
interest rate and GDP in € billions under the three scenarios. The dynamic paths 
illustrated in Figure D imply a prolonged deterioration in Ireland’s fiscal position. Tables C 
and D quantify this deterioration in key Ireland’s fiscal variables over various time 
horizons, e.g. after one, five and ten years, for ‘moderate’ and ‘sharp’ scenarios 
respectively. 
FIGURE C TOTAL TAX REVENUES IN BILLIONS 
 
Source:  Department of Finance and QEC calculations. 
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FIGURE D KEY FISCAL/MACRO VARIABLES 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and QEC calculations. 
 
In the ‘moderate’ scenario, the emerging fiscal gap averages €1.5 billion per 
annum over the next ten years. In the absence of any specific fiscal policy reaction, 
this fiscal gap is expected to weaken Ireland’s fiscal position. Even a moderate CT 
reversal can generate a prolonged deterioration in Ireland’s fiscal aggregates. 
Indicatively, the starting point surplus could turn from +1 per cent to a -0.16 per 
cent deficit as a share of GDP, i.e. a deterioration of 1.16 p.p. in just one year, 
while it would stay lower than the baseline even after ten years. The debt-to-GDP 
ratio would persistently increase from 63.6 per cent in 2018 to 68 per cent after 
five years and surpass the level of 70 per cent after ten years, i.e. increases of 4 
and  
7 p.p. respectively. Similarly the debt-to-GNI* ratio would increase from 104.3 per 
cent to 112 per cent and 116 per cent after five and ten years respectively. 
 
TABLE C PUBLIC FINANCES UNDER THE ‘MODERATE’ FALL SCENARIO 
 Debt-to-GDP (%) 
Debt-to-GNI* 
(%) 
10Y Govt Bonds Rate 
(basis points) 
Surplus-to-GDP 
(%) 
Starting value 63.6 104.3 0.94 1 
1Y 65 107 +5 -0.17 
5Y 68 112 +9 0.38 
10Y 71 116 +14 0.59 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and QEC calculations. 
. 
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In the ‘sharp’ CT loss scenario the impact on the fiscal variables will be much 
stronger. Tax revenues would be lower than the baseline by €4.5 billion per annum 
on average over the next decade. This would result in a deficit-to-GDP of 2.5 per 
cent in the first year; while Ireland would run a long-lasting deficit for at least one 
decade. Finally, the debt-to-GDP ratio would reach 77 per cent and 84 per cent in 
five and ten years respectively after the initial fall in CT revenues. This translates to 
an increase in the debt-to-GNI* ratio from 104.3 per cent to 126 per cent and  
138 per cent in five and ten years respectively. 
 
TABLE D PUBLIC FINANCES UNDER THE ‘SHARP’ FALL SCENARIO 
 Debt-to-GDP (%) 
Debt-to-GNI* 
(%) 
10Y Govt Bonds Rate 
(basis points) 
Surplus-to-GDP 
(%) 
Starting value 63.6 104.3 0.94 1 
1Y 69 114 +12 -2.5 
5Y 77 126 +28 -0.8 
10Y 84 138 +45 -0.2 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and QEC calculations. 
 
Such fiscal shocks would impact Ireland’s macro economy through at least two 
channels. First, through the increase in international cost of borrowing and second 
through the adoption of the necessary fiscal policy changes if the resulting fiscal 
gap were to be closed. Here, we assume that fiscal policy does not react. Thus, the 
effects of the first channel only would see Irish GDP being €8 billion and €26 billion 
lower in the first year of the shock due to the ‘moderate’ and ‘sharp’ scenarios 
respectively. Over a ten-year horizon, the negative effect is estimated to be around 
€5 billion and €16 billion per annum on average compared to the baseline under 
the two scenarios. 
Our analysis implies that a potential reversal of the recent windfall elements of CT 
receipts poses a significant fiscal risk for Ireland. Were this risk to materialise, it 
would weaken Ireland’s public finances for a prolonged period and thus might 
require restrictive fiscal policy measures to be implemented. This would 
undoubtedly have a negative impact on Ireland’s macro economy. Thus, it is 
imperative that these windfall amounts are not used on an ongoing basis to fund 
current Government expenditure. This research further strengthens the argument 
to build up fiscal buffers to absorb such external shocks (see Casey et al., 2018), in 
order to mitigate the effects of volatile CT receipts on Ireland’s macro economy.  
 
References 
Casey E. and A. Hannon (2016). ‘Challenges in Forecasting Irish Corporation Tax’, 
Irish Fiscal Advisory Council Analytical Note No. 10. 
 
60 |  Q ua rt er ly  Eco nom ic  C omme nt ary  –  Wi nt er  20 19   
 
Casey E., N. Conroy, A. Osés-Arranz and K. Timoney (2018). ‘Designing a Rainy Day 
Fund to work within EU fiscal rules’, Irish Fiscal Advisory Council Working Paper 
No. 6.  
Conefrey T., G. O’Reilly and G. Walsh (2019). ‘Fiscal Windfalls: A Model-Based 
Analysis’, Economic Letter, Vol. 2019, No. 3. 
Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (2018). Fiscal Assessment Report, November 2018. 
Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (2019a). Fiscal Assessment Report, June 2019. 
Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (2019b). Summary Assessment, November 2019. 
McGuinness G. and D. Smyth (2019). Modelling recent developments in corporation 
tax. Department of Finance. 
Varthalitis P. (2019). ‘FIR-GEM: A SOE-DSGE Model for fiscal policy analysis in 
Ireland’, ESRI Working Papers No. 620. 
 
This Box was prepared by Petros Varthalitis 
 
Budget 2020 saw the Government introduce a package of approximately 
€2.9 billion of which €2.6 billion consisted of an increase in current expenditure 
and €800 million went on increased capital spending. Overall there was about 
€426 million in net tax increases. Due to the non-indexation of taxation and 
welfare bands and the increase in carbon taxes, most households are likely to pay 
more in taxation due to the Budget.20 For some, this will be partly offset by some 
of the increases in Government expenditure, however, if a No-Deal Brexit does 
not come to pass in the next year and hence the Government does not spend the 
resources which were allocated for such an eventuality, then the overall stance of 
the budgetary package is likely to be contractionary.  
 
In terms of servicing the sovereign debt, the country is pre-funded until Q1 2020. 
In general, the National Treasury Management Agency, NTMA, has used the 
period of Quantitative Easing (QE) to lengthen the sovereign’s debt maturities 
and hence lower interest costs and debt repayments. At ten years, the Irish 
sovereign has one of the longest weighted average maturities in Europe. Interest 
costs on the sovereign debt, which prior to QE were forecast to be €10 billion, will 
by the end of 2019 fall below €5 billion. 
 
Under our baseline outlook, and subject to the assumption that actual and profile 
expenditure remain closely correlated for the rest of the year, we now believe 
that the General Government Balance is likely to be in balance in 2019. While we 
 
                                                          
 
20  For more on this see:  https://www.esri.ie/news/extra-2020-spending-on-public-services-and-pay-funded-by-real-
tax-increases 
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had forecast a mild surplus for 2020 in the previous Commentary, the increased 
expenditure outlined in Budget 2020 means that a mild deficit is now a likelihood 
next year. We summarise the resulting implications for our forecasts of the debt-
to-output ratios in Figure 50. By the end of 2020, we believe the debt-to-GDP 
ratio will be 54 per cent while debt-to-GNI* will have fallen just below 90 per 
cent. 
 
FIGURE 50 DEBT-TO-GDP AND DEBT-TO-GNI* RATIOS (%) 
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations.  
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General Assessment 
 
2019 saw the Irish economy demonstrate another resilient performance in the 
face of significant uncertainty. While the Brexit issue has not gone away and will 
continue to be a factor in the years ahead, the domestic economy still looks set to 
register growth of approximately 5.8 per cent in 2019. This is quite remarkable as 
it means the economy has grown on average by 4.5 per cent per annum since 
2010.21 To put this in perspective, the European Union has only witnessed growth 
of 1.6 per cent per annum for the same period. 
 
It is still too early to assess whether recent Brexit related developments have 
ameliorated the uncertainty which exerted contractionary pressures on the 
domestic economy over the past 12 to 14 months. However, in the short-run at 
least, it does appear that the possibility of a ‘No-Deal’ exit by the United Kingdom 
has receded. Our forecast for the Irish economy in 2020, subject to the 
assumption that no change in the trading relationship between the UK and the 
EU will take place within the forecast horizon (i.e. either a deal with transition 
scenario materialises or a further extension is granted), is for growth of 3.3 per 
cent. This more moderate rate compared with previous years reflects the 
relatively slow rate of growth now likely in key trading partners for the year 
ahead. 
 
While the most recent agreement reached between the UK Government and the 
European Union does appear to have averted a ‘No-Deal’ exit in the short term, 
the stated preference of the UK for a free trade agreement over the longer term 
will give rise to some difficult choices for both domestic and European 
policymakers in the years ahead. Indeed there is considerable potential for both 
intra and inter country tension within the European Union as it considers various 
UK proposals in future negotiations. To date, these tensions have been largely 
absent during the Withdrawal Agreement phase and the European side has been 
characterised by strong unity of purpose. Given the complexity of negotiating a 
free trade agreement, it means that continued uncertainty is set to befall certain 
sectors of the Irish economy over the medium term. The agricultural sector, the 
fishing sector and the tourism sector more broadly will have to contend with the 
consideration of different possible policy regimes, some of which may have 
radical implications for the sectors concerned. 
 
 
                                                          
 
21  This is even after including an observation of 5.5 per cent for 2015 as opposed to the official rate of 23 per cent. The 
5.5 per cent rate was estimated as the underlying rate of economic growth for the Irish economy in 2015 in the 
Quarterly Economic Commentary (2016). 
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Against this backdrop Budget 2020 proved to be a broadly prudent package with 
relatively few changes in personal taxation rates. Indeed given the non-
indexation of taxation rates and welfare bands and the introduction of the carbon 
tax, the package, in the absence of a No-Deal Brexit,22 is likely to be mildly 
contractionary. From a macroeconomic perspective, given the underlying pace of 
growth in the Irish economy at present, this is probably the optimal policy. 
However, as identified by Doorley and Roantree (2020), freezing most tax 
thresholds and benefits rates in cash terms will leave household incomes lower 
than under a neutral budget. This will be offset partially for some households by 
increases in certain areas of Government expenditure. 
 
The overall state of the fiscal accounts in 2019 is likely to benefit from another 
increase in corporation tax receipts. For the year to November, these receipts 
have increased by over 2 per cent. However, this contrasts with the profile or 
target increase outlined by the Irish Department of Finance at the start of the 
year which expected these receipts to decline by 2 per cent for the present year. 
The volatility of these receipts has given rise to concerns about the potential 
‘windfall’ nature of a certain component of corporation tax returns. In a Box in 
the current Commentary, Varthalitis, using a recently specified dynamic 
stochastic generated equilibrium (DSGE) model of the Irish economy, examines 
the implications of a reduction in the windfall component of corporation receipts 
on key fiscal metrics. The results of the analysis highlight the vulnerability of the 
Irish public finances to significant variations in these receipts. This variation is 
mainly associated with the transactions of certain multinational firms which 
operate in the Irish economy. Furthermore, the results reiterate the need for the 
Government to ensure that current expenditure is funded purely on the basis of 
sustainable elements of taxation revenues. If agreement is reached during the 
ongoing international discussions at an OECD level on corporation tax issue (or 
any subsequent European initiative), this may have implications for the level and 
structure of multinational activity in Ireland. This further highlights the need to 
prudently manage the fiscal receipts from corporation tax.  
 
In the current Commentary there are two Research Notes published which deal 
with regional issues in the Irish housing market. The first by Allen-Coghlan, 
McQuinn and O’Toole (2019) examines house price sustainability at a county 
level. The Note, which compiles a unique database of regional housing 
information, uses a variety of finance-based measures including the house price-
to-rent ratio in assessing regional markets. The analysis suggests that 
notwithstanding the significant pace of house price growth observed, current 
levels are closely related to developments in regional labour markets. However, 
 
                                                          
 
22  Certain funds were set aside as a contingency for a No-Deal Brexit. However, in the absence of a ‘No-Deal’, these 
funds will presumably not now be spent. 
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significant divergence is observed in the pace of house price growth across 
counties. The Note outlines a Heat Index, which measures the stability or 
otherwise of regional markets and recommends that this index be updated on a 
regular and timely basis. 
 
The Note by Allen-Coghlan, Judge, O’Toole and Slaymaker (2019) examines 
housing affordability for potential first time buyers at the county level. The 
research estimates the percentage of monthly income that would be spent on 
mortgage repayments if first time buyers on average incomes were to purchase a 
property at the average first time buyer price in each county. The findings suggest 
that, in 2018, potential first time buyers would have faced a mortgage 
repayment-to-income ratio of more than 30 per cent in Dublin, Wicklow, Kildare 
and Meath, highlighting the acute affordability pressures in and around the 
capital city. The mortgage repayment-to-income ratio is also relatively high in the 
counties of Galway and Cork while affordability pressures are not as evident in 
other counties. 
 
Building on both pieces of research, in another Box in the Commentary, Allen-
Coghlan and McQuinn, using housing market data, estimate the degree of 
convergence across the Irish economy from 2007 onwards. Their analysis 
suggests that some parts of the country have grown significantly faster than 
others and that, in general, there has been a divergence rather than convergence 
in regional economic growth during this period. This is a significant challenge and 
one the Government is seeking to address in its National Development Plan 
(NDP)23 mainly through rolling out significant investment over the period 2018 to 
2027. However, in certain areas such as Cork city it appears that there is growing 
frustration with the pace at which public investment is being put in place.24 It 
may be necessary for Government policy to ensure that key infrastructure can be 
fast-tracked in certain designated regional growth centres to facilitate faster 
growth outside of the greater Dublin area. 
 
  
 
                                                          
 
23  See https://www.gov.ie/en/policy-information/07e507-national-development-plan-2018-2027/ for more details. 
24  See Cork Chamber of Commerce: https://www.corkchamber.ie/economic-trends/ and 
https://www.corkindependent.com/news/topics/articles/2019/09/04/4179167-dunkettle-delay-depressing/ 
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 FORECAST TABLE A1 EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 % change in 2020 2020 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 192.9 8.0 13.8 208.2 10.4 9.0 229.7 6.6 5.0 245.0 
Tourism 5.0 5.3 3.5 5.2 4.0 4.0 5.4 3.6 3.6 5.6 
Other Services 154.7 10.1 5.4 170.3 12.7 11.0 191.9 9.3 8.0 209.7 
Exports of Goods and Services 352.6 8.9 10.3 383.8 11.3 9.7 427.3 7.8 6.1 460.4 
FISM Adjustment 7.1     12.6     13.4     14.4 
Adjusted Exports 359.7 8.9 8.9 396.4 5.6 4.2 440.7 5.8 4.3 474.8 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 INVESTMENT 
 
2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 % change in 2020 2020 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 5.6 28.0 25.8 7.1 19.3 14.9 8.5 22.4 17.5 10.4 
Other Building 12.7 14.7 7.1 14.6 21.3 12.0 17.7 18.0 9.0 20.7 
Transfer Costs 1.1 24.4 14.0 1.4 17.9 8.0 1.6 17.1 7.0 1.9 
Building and Construction 20.4 18.8 12.5 24.2 20.3 12.5 29.1 19.2 11.6 34.7 
Machinery and Equipment 72.8 -29.1 -30.4 51.7 63.6 59.7 84.5 4.6 2.6 88.4 
Total Investment 93.2 -18.6 -21.1 75.9 49.8 45.0 113.6 8.4 4.7 123.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A3 PERSONAL INCOME 
 
2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 % change in 2020 2020 
 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture 0.7 1.6 0.0 0.7 2.4 0.0 0.7 1.2 0.0 0.7 
Non-Agricultural 87.4 5.9 5.1 92.6 6.3 5.9 98.4 6.1 6.0 104.5 
Rental Income 10.1 18.4 1.9 12.0 7.8 0.9 12.9 10.0 1.3 14.2 
Other Income 15.2 0.1 0.0 15.3 11.5 1.8 17.0 8.4 1.4 18.4 
Total Income Received 113.5 6.2 7.0 120.5 7.1 8.6 129.1 6.8 8.8 137.9 
Current Transfers 8.1 -2.4 -0.2 7.9 -11.4 -0.9 7.0 -4.0 -0.3 6.8 
Gross Personal Income 121.7 5.6 6.8 128.5 6.0 7.7 136.2 6.2 8.5 144.6 
Taxes on Income and Wealth -22.4 7.8 -1.7 -24.1 6.4 -1.6 -25.7 4.0 -1.0 -26.7 
Personal Disposable Income 99.3 5.1 5.1 104.3 5.9 6.1 110.5 6.7 7.4 117.9 
Consumption 95.6 5.2 5.0 100.5 4.5 4.5 105.0 4.3 4.6 109.6 
Personal Savings 11.2 2.8 0.3 11.5 11.8 1.4 12.8 23.9 3.1 15.9 
Savings Ratio 10.7 
  
10.5   11.1   12.8 
Average Personal Tax Rate 0.18   0.19   0.19   0.18 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4 IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES  
 
2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 % change in 2020 2020 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 85.2 15.6 13.0 98.5 6.5 5.0 104.9 13.0 11.0 118.6 
Tourism 5.8 8.8 8.3 6.3 9.6 8.0 6.9 7.8 6.0 7.5 
Other Services 172.2 4.2 3.7 179.5 31.7 30.0 236.4 7.1 5.5 253.1 
Imports of Goods and Services 263.3 8.0 -2.9 284.4 22.4 20.3 348.2 9.0 7.3 379.1 
FISM Adjustment 30.8 
  
4.6   4.1   4.7 
Adjusted Imports 294.0 -1.7 -2.9 289.0 21.7 20.2 351.8 8.9 7.2 383.3 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
 
2017 2018 2019 2020 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 352.6 383.8 427.3 460.4 
Imports of Goods and Services 263.3 284.4 348.2 379.1 
Net Factor Payments -61.1 -69.7 -77.9 -80.3 
Net Transfers -3.1 -3.4 -3.7 -4.1 
Balance on Current Account 1.5 34.3 -2.5 -3.1 
As a % of GNP 0.6 13.6 -0.9 -1.1 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6 EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, ANNUAL AVERAGE 
 2017 2018 2019 2020 
 ‘000 ‘000 ‘000 ‘000 
Agriculture 110.4 107.4 100.6 99.0 
Industry 412.1 423.3 435.7 445.7 
Of which: Construction 128.7 143.4 147.4 151.8 
Services 1,664.5 1,719.5 1,773.4 1,807.9 
Total at Work 2,194.2 2,257.6 2,309.9 2,353.2 
Unemployed 157.7 137.3 125.0 113.9 
Labour Force 2,352.3 2,395.2 2,434.9 2,467.1 
Unemployment Rate, % 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.6 
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IRISH HOUSE PRICE SUSTAINABILITY: A COUNTY-LEVEL ANALYSIS
 
* Matthew Allen-Coghlan, Kieran McQuinn, Conor O’Toole1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of a number of high profile property crashes, a question that has 
come to the fore recently is; are housing booms and busts clustered in specific 
areas within countries or do they tend to be more pan-regional? Within the 
United States for example, considerable variation in the boom-bust cycle has 
been experienced with the so-called ‘sand states’ (California, Florida, Arizona, and 
Nevada) showing much greater fluctuations in prices than other regions following 
the financial crisis.2 In an Irish context, a significant issue of interest is the 
apparent divergence between the Dublin property market and other regional 
markets as well as the difference between urban and rural areas.  
 
Mainly due to a lack of data, few research papers have assessed the sustainability 
of house prices in Ireland at a regional level. In this Research Note, we compile a 
series of regional housing indicators to provide insights into the regional 
dimension of price sustainability and explore how the housing market is 
developing across Ireland. One of these indicators is the rent-to-house price ratio 
(yield). This can be used as an indicator of market stability, as depressed yields 
can indicate asset values increasing beyond the cash flows associated with the 
asset. This paper extends the work of McQuinn (2017)3 who considers the 
developments of Irish house prices in recent years and the extent to which they 
are explained by economic fundamentals. We apply the same model to each 
county in Ireland to determine the stability of house prices at a more granular 
level.  
 
In this Note, we also discuss in more detail the research presented in McQuinn et 
al. (2019) which uses underlying finance theory and the user cost of capital 
method to present a Heat Index for Irish counties. This approach has the 
considerable advantage of having a particular theoretical structure and allows us 
to decompose investors’ attitudes to the housing market. The Heat Index 
 
                                                          
 
1  This research has been funded by the Irish Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government under the 
collaborative research programme between the Department and the ESRI. We would like to thank all those in the 
Department for their comments on a previous draft. Any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors. 
2  Bhattacharya and Kim (2011). ‘Economic Fundamentals, Subprime Lending and Housing Prices: Evidence from MSA-
Level Panel Data’, Housing Studies, 26(6).  
3  McQuinn, Kieran (2017). ‘Irish house prices: Déjà vu all over again?’, Quarterly Economic Commentary: Special 
Articles, Winter, QEC2017WIN_SA_McQuinn. 
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captures the extent to which the yield is departing from the underlying risk-free 
rate (in our case the mortgage interest rate). Relatively high values of the Heat 
Index indicate a more unstable market.  
 
Undertaking this research has been made feasible due to the bridging of two 
considerable data gaps in the Irish housing market in recent years. First, since 
2010 the CSO has produced granular regional house price data drawing on the 
new property price register. Second, since Q3 2007 the RTB in conjunction with 
the ESRI have published quarterly standardised average rents at a county level. 
Combining these datasets provides the opportunity to explore trends in the rent-
to-house price ratio for each county over time.  
 
Overall, reviewing the rent yield across Irish counties, it is clear that at present 
yields are greater than the current borrowing rate and above the rate they were 
during the tail end of the housing boom. In general, the critical indicators of 
sustainability indicate that the market is well explained by fundamentals, though 
it should be noted the relationship between prices and fundamentals can change 
rapidly. A sharp increase/decrease in house prices and/or significant change in 
one of the factors in the user cost model could lead to prices moving out of line 
with the underlying value of housing. It is therefore proposed that these 
indicators are updated and used on an ongoing basis as a means of continually 
assessing property price developments in the Irish market.  
 
Across counties, there is considerable variation in the sustainability indicators 
with more rural counties appearing to be the least at risk of overheating. This is 
likely due to failure of house prices to recover in these areas following the major 
decline in prices after the financial crisis. Counties in the South and South-East 
appear to have the highest values of the Heat Index, however this is not to be 
read as evidence that these markets are experiencing unsustainable inflation in 
prices or that the market is out of sync with fundamentals.  
 
The rest of this Research Note is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the 
theory for the indicators of price sustainability. Section 3 documents trends in 
rental yields across Irish counties. Section 4 documents trends in price 
sustainability using the Heat Index. Section 5 concludes.  
2. MEASURING HOUSE PRICE SUSTAINABILITY: A USER COST APPROACH 
The price to rent approach to assessing housing markets can be characterised by 
an underlying notion of arbitrage, with the returns to investing in housing relative 
to some other asset evaluated, or the costs and benefits of renting a house 
relative to buying compared. The approach, which builds on the Jorgensen (1963; 
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1967) theory of the user cost of capital, was first applied to housing markets by 
Poterba (1984) and assumes that, absent substantial frictions and credit 
restrictions, arbitrage between owner-occupied and rental housing ensures that 
the rent-to-house price ratio depends on the real user cost of capital. 
Himmelberg et al. (2005) construct a variant measure of the user cost of housing; 
the imputed annual rental cost of owning a home. This measure compares the 
value of living in a property for a year (the ‘imputed rent’) and the income lost for 
not investing in an alternative investment (the ‘opportunity cost of capital’). It 
takes into account differences in taxes, expenses, anticipated capital gains and 
risk. 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡 =  ℎ𝑝𝑡 �𝑟𝑡𝑅𝑅 +  𝑟𝑡𝑅𝑅 +  𝜎𝑡 +  𝜏𝑡 −  ∆ℎ𝑝𝑡𝑒 ℎ𝑝𝑡� �     (1) 
Where ℎ𝑝𝑡 is real house prices, ℎ𝑝𝑡𝑒 is expected real house prices, 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡 is actual 
rent levels, 𝜏𝑡 relates to any property taxes to which the homeowner is liable, 𝜎𝑡 
is the natural rate of depreciation of the house, 𝑟𝑡𝑅𝑅 is the real risk-free interest 
rate and 𝑟𝑡𝑅𝑅 is the additional risk premium to compensate homeowners for the 
higher risk of owning versus renting.4 
 
Re-arranging (1) gives the following 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡
ℎ𝑝𝑡
� =  �𝑟𝑡𝑅𝑅 +  𝑟𝑡𝑅𝑅 + 𝜎𝑡 +  𝜏𝑡 −  ∆ℎ𝑝𝑡𝑒 ℎ𝑝𝑡� �     (2) 
Taxation can have a significant impact on the user cost of capital that can either 
be negative or positive depending on whether the tax is favourable or not for 
homeowners. For example, Barham (2004) found that due to homeowners not 
being taxed on capital gains to housing, the user cost of capital was negative over 
much of the period 1976-2003. However, taxation is not the focus of this paper 
and its inclusion would require us to use a representative family structure which 
would reduce our indicators’ generality for the market as a whole. For the 
purpose of obtaining valuable expressions for evaluating the sustainability of the 
property market we omit both taxation and depreciation. Using data and taking 
this simplified version of (2), we obtain an expression for the rent yield: 
 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡 ℎ𝑝𝑡�
=  �𝑟𝑡𝑅𝑅 + 𝑟𝑡𝑅𝑅 −  ∆ℎ𝑝𝑡𝑒 ℎ𝑝𝑡� �      (3) 
The simplified rent-to-house price ratio is now a function of three factors: the 
ratio can be low due to real interest rates being low; or because people feel that 
 
                                                          
 
4  Risk premiums can change over time depending on the volatility of house prices. Large fluctuations in house prices 
are likely to increase the risk of owning versus renting and thus increase the risk premium. 
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house prices will grow fast; or they feel good about risk and are prepared to 
accept a low risk premium. 
 
It is important to note that the expression (3) does not quantify how irrational 
investors are. The housing market may be overvalued, for example, when either 
forecasts of price increases are too high or the risk premium is too low. If these 
concepts are combined together, a ‘Heat Index’ of the housing market can be 
provided: 
𝐻𝑟𝐻𝑟 𝐼𝑟𝐼𝑟𝐼 =  ∆ℎ𝑝𝑡𝑒 ℎ𝑝𝑡� −  𝑟𝑡𝑅𝑅 = 𝑟𝑡𝑅𝑅 − 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡 ℎ𝑝𝑡�      (4) 
A particular economic or housing related shock may result in households revising 
their estimate of risk and, consequently, their expected return. A combination of 
these two factors can cause house prices to increase vis-à-vis their fundamental 
levels. If a significant deviation between the actual and fundamental price 
emerges, then estimates of risk are likely to increase until the observed level of 
risk is so high, housing demand falls and house prices decline sharply. 
3. TRENDS IN THE RENT-TO-HOUSE PRICE RATIO ACROSS IRELAND 
To begin our assessment of price sustainability at a county level in Ireland, we 
review trends in the rent-to-house price ratio (yield) across counties to 
contextualise the discussion. Following the financial crisis in Ireland, both rental 
prices and house prices plummeted as economic fundamentals deteriorated. The 
severity of the economic crisis in Ireland was extreme by international standards 
and highly correlated to the major price inflation for both rents and house prices 
during the boom phase of the credit cycle, 2002-2007. Though the rise and fall of 
the Irish property market has been well documented, few papers have 
considered the regional variation in the Irish house market over this period, with 
McCann (2016)5 and Morgenroth (2014; 2016)6 being notable exceptions. 
However, neither of these papers considered trends in rental yields as a measure 
of house price sustainability. One study which does model the change in yields in 
Ireland is Lyons (2017)7 who models the effect of credit conditions on rental 
yields. We build on this research by focusing on exploring trends in the more 
recent time period (2010-2018) when prices have been recovering rapidly.  
 
 
                                                          
 
5  McCann, Fergal (2016). ‘Exploring developments in Ireland's regional rental markets’, No 13/EL/16, Economic Letters, 
Central Bank of Ireland. 
6  Morgenroth, Edgar (2014). Modelling the Impact of Fundamentals on County Housing Markets in Ireland, MPRA 
Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany.  
Morgenroth, Edgar (2016). Housing Supply and House Price Trends at the County Level, No RN2016/1/1, Research 
Notes, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). 
7  Lyons, Ronan (2017). Credit conditions and the housing price ratio: evidence from Ireland's bubble and crash, 
Economic Papers, Trinity College Dublin, Economics Department. 
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It should be noted that there will be a degree of endogeneity between rent and 
house prices that may lessen the value of rent yield as a measure for the 
sustainability of house prices. As house prices increase, less people will be able to 
afford to purchase a home and more people will be forced into the rental market, 
which in turn will drive up rent levels. This is especially true in urban areas where 
housing supply is insufficient to meet structural demand and where the Central 
Bank macroprudential rules, which place limits on the LTI and LTV ratios, are 
more binding. If an increase in house prices in a county directly leads to an 
increase in rents, then the yield will be less informative as a measure of 
sustainability.  
 
The trend in yield over time in Ireland is presented in Figure 1. The chart presents 
the national average, the national median and the dispersion in rents across 
counties. The interquartile range is also presented which allows us to document 
how varied or compressed yields were across the 26 counties over the period 
2010-2018. We use this analysis period as it coincides with the CSO new property 
price indices which were first released in 2010. The county with the minimum and 
maximum yields are also presented to give a full description of the underlying 
distribution. Over the period 2010-2014, yields increased in Ireland from under  
4 per cent to just over 6 per cent in Q1 2014. As both house prices and rents 
decreased over the period, the increase in the yields comes through house prices 
falling faster than rents. From 2014 to mid-2015, the yield appears to have 
stabilised before falling again as rental price inflation outpaced house price 
growth. As of Q3 2018 the national average yield stood at about 4.7 per cent. In 
terms of the cross-county variation, the narrow band on the interquartile range 
indicates that most counties in Ireland have similar rental yields. The generalised 
trend over time shows that many counties co-move with overall country 
variation. This highlights the interlinkage of the national property market and 
perhaps lends evidence to the theory that housing booms and busts are pan-
regional in nature.  
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FIGURE 1 DISPERSION OF RENT-TO-HOUSE PRICE RATIO (YIELD, %) Q1 2010- Q3 2018 
 
Source:  ESRI analysis of CSO and RTB data.  
 
Figure 2 displays the rental yields across counties for 2018. The highest yields 
are in the Midland and Border regions. House price declines were steep in 
these areas following the crisis and have not recovered to the same extent as 
in Dublin and the larger urban centres where labour market improvements 
and economic expansion have been greatest. Rents have increased in these 
areas more recently which has led to an improvement in the yield. The 
county with the highest yield in Ireland in 2018 was Roscommon at 6.7 per 
cent, followed by Offaly at 6.2 per cent and Monaghan at 6.0 per cent. The 
lowest rental yields were in counties in the South-East where house prices 
have recovered to a greater extent than rental prices. Wexford had the 
lowest yield in 2018 at 3.4 per cent with Kilkenny and Wicklow on  
3.6 per cent.  
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FIGURE 2 MAP OF RENTAL YIELDS ACROSS COUNTIES 2018 
 
 
Source:  ESRI analysis of CSO and RTB data. 
Note:  The time period combined for 2018 is Q1-Q3. 
 
To provide insight into how yields develop over time, Figure 3 presents a map 
of the change in rental yields per county over the period 2013-2018. In all 
counties except Offaly (where yields grew marginally at 0.6 percentage 
points), yields declined over the period 2013-2018. The biggest decline was 
2.1 percentage points in Kilkenny followed by 1.9 percentage points in 
Wexford, Mayo and Sligo. The national average yield declined by  
1.1 percentage points over the period. Dublin yields declined by 1 percentage 
point from 5.3 per cent to 4.3 per cent while yields in Cork declined by  
1.5 percentage points from 5.3 to 3.8 per cent. Table A.1 provides an 
overview of the figures for all counties.  
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FIGURE 3 MAP OF CHANGE IN RENTAL YIELDS ACROSS COUNTIES BETWEEN 2013 AND 2018 
 
 
Source:  ESRI analysis of CSO and RTB data. 
Note:  The time period combined for 2018 is Q1-Q3. 
4. ASSESSING COUNTY-LEVEL PRICE SUSTAINABILITY 
A county-level Heat Index 
In this section, we present the results of the Heat Index across Irish counties over 
the period 2010-2018. The interpretation of the Heat Index is as follows: house 
prices are more likely to be overvalued when the Index is high, i.e. when the rent 
yield is low relative to the risk-free rate. This will be the case when expectations 
of house price growth are high or investors’ risk premiums are low. By definition, 
when the housing market is overvalued, expectations of house prices are too high 
and/or the risk premiums of those who purchase houses are too low (i.e. they are 
undervaluing the level of risk of a house purchase). This leads to the Heat Index 
being at a higher level than it should be based on the fundamental value of 
housing. However, whether the housing market is overvalued can only be 
determined after the fact when past house price expectations are compared 
against the eventual realised house prices. Even if the Index is high, if house price 
expectations and risk assessments turn out to be correct then the market cannot 
be considered overvalued. While the Index can’t explicitly tell us if the market is 
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currently overvalued, by comparing against past levels of the Index we can get an 
idea if current attitudes towards risk and perceptions about the future growth of 
house prices bear a resemblance to those seen during periods when the market 
was frothy.8  
 
Figure 4 outlines the dispersion of the Heat Index over time for Irish counties. It 
includes the mean, median, minimum and maximum levels as well as the 
interquartile range for each period. Throughout 2010, the Index was declining as 
the legacy of the housing crash began to abate and the yields rose. In early 2011, 
the Heat Index had stabilised overall and has remained relatively static through to 
2018. The stability of the Index over the past several years and the fact that yields 
have been significantly above both the risk-free rate and previous yield levels 
during the tail end of the housing boom suggests that Irish yields are not 
indicating that the market is currently overheated. This finding is in line with 
McQuinn (2017) that the Irish housing market appears close to equilibrium with 
prices explained by fundamentals. 
 
FIGURE 4  DISPERSION OF HEAT INDEX Q1 2010-Q3 2018 
 
Source:  ESRI analysis of CSO and RTB data. 
 
 
                                                          
 
8  Though housing has the potential to generate returns through rent and capital appreciation it cannot be thought of 
as strictly a financial asset. Housing has both an investment and consumption component. As it is not purchased 
solely as an investment there is a limitation to applying a financial model to assessing it. This should be kept in mind 
when comparing the index between counties as there are likely to be different underlying factors driving demand for 
housing between counties beyond their risk return outlook. 
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While the county-level data behind the Heat Index are only available from 2010 
onward, a national Heat Index can be calculated going back before the financial 
crisis. Figure 5 shows that from 2006 there was a sharp increase in the Heat Index 
which peaked in 2009 before declining sharply in 2010. It is clear that the level of 
the Heat Index from 2006 to 2009 is significantly higher than the prevailing rate in 
the post-crisis years. We propose that the Index over this time period be used as 
a benchmark by which to compare the current level of the Index and thus be used 
as an indicator as to whether the housing market is showing signs of overheating. 
 
FIGURE 5  HEAT INDEX MEAN Q3 2006-Q3 2018 
 
 
Source:  ESRI analysis of CSO and RTB data. 
 
A key contribution of this research is to look at the variation across counties, and 
to explore the extent to which differences may exist in the alignment of regional 
market prices to fundamentals. In this regard, it is clear from Figure 6 that, while 
some county outliers do exist across the country, a majority of counties follow 
the national picture as the Heat Index is closely dispersed across counties.  
 
Figure 6 displays the Heat Index across counties for 2018. The lighter colour 
counties are those with the lowest (most negative) values of the Heat Index while 
the darker counties have the highest (least negative) values. Again, the closer the 
Heat Index to positive values, the frothier the county market is in comparison to 
the national average. It is clear that the counties with the highest levels of the 
Heat Index are along the South and South-East coast. As of 2018, the county with 
the lowest level of the Heat Index market was Roscommon with a value of -4.65, 
while Offaly and Monaghan had the second and third lowest levels respectively. 
In these counties, where house prices dropped dramatically and the convergence 
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back following the recovery has been slow, it is unsurprising that the risk of 
overheating is the lowest. The county with the highest number in the Heat Index 
is Wexford at -1.36, with Kilkenny, Wicklow and Cork close behind. These 
counties, where house prices have recovered more rapidly than rents, have 
higher levels of the Heat Index as yields are closer to the risk-free rate.  
 
FIGURE 6 MAP OF HEAT INDEX ACROSS COUNTIES 2018 
 
 
Source:  ESRI analysis of CSO and RTB data. 
Note:  The time period combined for 2018 is Q1-Q3. 
 
To provide insight into the county-level change in the Heat Index over time, 
Figure 7 presents a map of the change in the Index per county over the 
period 2013-2018. The biggest increase in the Heat Index was in Wexford, 
Kilkenny, Mayo and Sligo. The Heat Index declined in a number of counties 
including Offaly, Meath, Cavan, Monaghan, Clare and Limerick.  
 
Overall, reviewing this critical indicator of price sustainability across Irish 
counties, it is reasonably clear than the Irish housing market is not currently 
displaying signs that it is overvalued. Across counties there is some variation 
with more rural counties, which experienced a major decline in house prices 
with less of a recovery, appearing to be the least at risk of overheating. 
Counties in the South and South-East appear to have the highest levels of the 
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Heat Index, however, this is not to be read as evidence that these markets 
are experiencing a degree of unsustainable inflation in prices or that the 
market is out of sync with fundamentals.  
 
FIGURE 7 MAP OF CHANGE IN HEAT INDEX ACROSS COUNTIES BETWEEN 2013 AND 2018 
 
 
Source:  ESRI analysis of CSO and RTB data. 
Note:  The time period combined for 2018 is Q1-Q3. 
 
To emphasise the heterogeneity in the property market across Ireland, the 
relationship between the degree of urbanisation and the Heat Index for each 
county is presented in Figure 8. This graph shows that counties with the highest 
levels of urbanisation (the highest proportion of residents living in urban areas) 
tend to be higher on the Heat Index. This illustrates the point that the risk of 
markets overheating is less of an issue for rural counties where house prices have 
yet to fully recover following their collapse in the years after the financial crisis. 
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FIGURE 8 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN URBANISATION AND HEAT INDEX 2018 
 
Source:  ESRI analysis of CSO and RTB data. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this Research Note, we explore trends in the rent-to-house price ratio in 
Ireland for the period 2010-2018 to provide insights into the regional dimension 
of price sustainability and explore how the housing market is developing across 
Ireland. The rent-to-house price ratio, or rental yield, can be used an indicator of 
market stability, as depressed yields can indicate asset values increasing beyond 
the cash flows associated with the asset.  
 
More specifically, we present a Heat Index for Irish counties. The Heat Index 
captures the extent to which the yield is departing from the underlying risk-free 
rate (in our case the mortgage interest rate). Higher than average values of the 
Heat Index are an indicator that the market may be becoming unstable. 
 
Overall, reviewing trends in the Heat Index as a measure of price sustainability 
across Irish counties, it is clear that the Irish market is not displaying yields that 
are below the borrowing rate or that are below yields seen pre-2011. This 
indicates that at present the Irish housing market is not overvalued from a user 
cost perspective. Overall the market appears to be explained by fundamentals 
with some variation across counties. More rural counties which experienced a 
major decline in house prices and less rebound in the recovery would appear to 
be the least at risk of overheating. Counties in the South and South-East appear 
to have the highest levels of the Heat Index, however, this is not to be read as 
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evidence that these markets are experiencing unsustainable inflation in prices or 
that the market is out of sync with fundamentals.  
 
From a policy perspective, a number of findings emerge. In general the Irish 
market does not currently display significant evidence of unsustainable house 
prices from a macro-financial perspective. We also do not find major differences 
across counties which would suggest any specific geographic areas are becoming 
unsustainable. Indeed, the close variation in the regional yields and price 
sustainability indices would suggest that county markets co-move closely in 
Ireland. This co-movement in prices may be explained by household mobility, as 
prospective purchasers react to high prices in one county by purchasing in an 
adjacent county, thereby increasing demand, and prices, in the latter. 
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APPENDIX 1  
TABLE A.1 COUNTY YIELDS 
County Rent:HP 2018  % 
Rent:HP 2013  
% 
Difference  
% 
Offaly 6.2  5.6  0.6  
Kerry 5.0  5.1  -0.1  
Meath 4.1  4.3  -0.1  
Monaghan 6.0  6.2  -0.3  
Limerick 4.3  4.8  -0.6  
Kildare 4.1  4.7  -0.6  
Cavan 5.7  6.4  -0.6  
Longford 5.9  6.6  -0.7  
Leitrim 4.9  5.8  -0.8  
Waterford 3.8  4.7  -0.9  
Donegal 4.7  5.7  -1.0  
Dublin 4.3  5.3  -1.0  
Roscommon 6.7  7.8  -1.0  
National Average 4.7  5.7  -1.1  
Louth 4.6  5.7  -1.1  
Wicklow 3.6  4.8  -1.2  
Laois 4.9  6.3  -1.4  
Cork 3.8  5.2  -1.4  
Carlow 4.4  5.8  -1.4  
Westmeath 4.8  6.3  -1.5  
Clare 4.0  5.6  -1.6  
Tipperary 4.4  6.1  -1.6  
Galway 5.4  7.2  -1.7  
Sligo 4.1  6.0  -1.9  
Mayo 4.6  6.5  -1.9  
Wexford 3.4  5.4  -1.9  
Kilkenny 3.6  5.7  -2.1  
 
Source:  ESRI analysis of CSO and RTB data. 
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TABLE A.2 COUNTY HEAT INDICES  
County Heat Index  2018 
Heat Index  
2013 
Difference  
% 
Kilkenny -1.50 -3.18 52.9  
Wexford -1.36 -2.83 52.0  
Sligo -2.00 -3.42 41.6  
Clare -1.93 -3.07 37.1  
Mayo -2.50 -3.96 37.0  
Cork -1.73 -2.67 35.2  
Wicklow -1.53 -2.31 33.7  
Tipperary -2.37 -3.54 33.0  
Carlow -2.28 -3.25 29.7  
Galway -3.35 -4.63 27.8  
Westmeath -2.70 -3.72 27.6  
Laois -2.84 -3.74 24.1  
Dublin -2.19 -2.76 20.5  
Waterford -1.74 -2.17 19.9  
Louth -2.57 -3.21 19.9  
National Average -2.59 -3.21 19.3  
Donegal -2.62 -3.14 16.4  
Leitrim -2.85 -3.23 11.8  
Roscommon -4.65 -5.22 11.0  
Kildare -1.99 -2.16 7.9  
Longford -3.78 -4.02 6.0  
Cavan -3.64 -3.82 4.7  
Limerick -2.19 -2.29 4.2  
Monaghan -3.88 -3.68 -5.3  
Kerry -2.92 -2.53 -15.4  
Meath -2.05 -1.72 -19.5  
Offaly -4.12 -3.08 -34.0  
 
Source:  ESRI analysis of CSO and RTB data.  
  
90 |  Q ua rt er ly  Eco nom ic  C omme nt ary  –  Wi nt er  20 19   
 
  
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  W i nt er  201 9  |  91  
 
A COUNTY-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE ON HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN 
IRELAND 
 
*  Matthew Allen-Coghlan, Conor Judge, Conor O’Toole, Rachel 
Slaymaker1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of housing affordability in Ireland has come to the fore in recent years 
as house prices have increased significantly following the recovery. In a recent 
survey, Corrigan et al. (2019a) find that 86.5 per cent of renters expressed a 
preference for homeownership. However, rising house prices have led to serious 
concerns about the ability of first time buyers (FTB) to enter the housing market. 
This group has been cited as one particular pressure point in recent assessments 
of market affordability (Housing Agency, 2017). Analysis published in the ESRI 
Quarterly Economic Commentary (McQuinn et al., 2018) finds that house price 
growth has been uneven across the distribution, with cheaper properties growing 
at faster rates than more expensive properties. This is likely to further exacerbate 
the affordability concerns of first time buyers, who typically enter the housing 
market at lower house price levels than second and subsequent borrowers.2 
 
To address the issue of first time buyer purchase affordability, a number of 
Government initiatives such as the Help to Buy scheme and the Rebuilding 
Ireland Home Loan for first time buyers, have been introduced with the aim of 
improving affordability.  
 
While house prices have increased substantially in recent years, the national 
trend in house prices gives no indication of the heterogeneity in house prices 
across the country. In addition, as both house prices and incomes vary on a 
regional basis, it is not possible to draw conclusions about housing affordability 
by simply looking at regional house prices. Understanding which areas face the 
 
                                                          
 
1  This research is a product of a joint research programme between the Department of Housing, Planning and Local 
Government and the Economic and Social Research Institute. The views presented in this paper are those of the 
authors alone and do not represent the official views of either the Department of Housing, Planning and Local 
Government or the Economic and Social Research Institute. Results presented in this paper are based on analysis of 
strictly controlled Research Microdata Files provided by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). The CSO does not take any 
responsibility for the views expressed or the outputs generated from this research. Any remaining errors are the 
authors’ own. 
2  Kinghan (2018) shows that in the first half of 2018 the average house price for first time buyers was approximately  
€287,000, as compared to €412,000 for second and subsequent borrowers. 
* Conor.OToole@esri.ie 
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greatest affordability challenges is crucial for policymakers when deciding where 
best to target supports.  
 
One of the major challenges to assessing housing affordability at a regional level 
is to obtain granular data on both house prices and incomes. In this Note, we 
address this by combining data from a number of sources to assess housing 
affordability challenges at the county level. More specifically, we combine CSO 
disposable income data from the regional accounts with Survey of Income and 
Living Conditions (SILC)3 data which contain information on both income and age, 
to obtain a measure of potential first time buyer incomes for each county. For 
house prices we exploit county-level data on first time buyer house prices from 
the CSO’s Residential Property Price Index (RPPI) dataset.  
 
We first document trends in county-level first time buyer house prices and 
incomes.4 Then to provide an insight into how affordability has developed for this 
group we explore the housing costs they would face if they were to enter the 
homeownership market. More specifically, we calculate the mortgage payment 
and subsequent mortgage repayment-to-income ratio they would face if they 
were to purchase a property at the mean first time buyer price in each county. 
Finally, we explore whether households would be left with sufficient residual 
income, after paying these housing costs, to attain a minimum essential standard 
of living as defined by the Vincentian Partnership for Social Justice.  
 
A number of recent studies have considered the issue of housing affordability. 
Corrigan et al. (2019) provide a detailed evaluation of the trends in housing 
affordability across existing renter and mortgage holder households in Ireland 
using the SILC household dataset. While this research provided a comprehensive 
review of trends in affordability across the market, the research did not 
specifically focus on the affordability level of new entrants to the housing market. 
Furthermore, as SILC is a nationally representative dataset with a relatively small 
number of observations at smaller geographic levels, the authors focused on 
broader regional breakdowns. One study which does focus on new market 
entrants is Turnbull (2017). Taking a long-term perspective, he examines whether 
owning a property is more or less affordable for young couples today compared 
to in the past. We build on this previous work, particularly Corrigan et al. (2019), 
 
                                                          
 
3  SILC is a voluntary survey that is conducted on annual basis in Ireland by the CSO. It is part of an EU-wide programme 
which allows policymakers to make comparisons across Member States. 
4  As the purpose of this Note is to determine affordability challenges for the average first time buyer we use the mean 
first time buyer income and house price in each county. The reason for using the mean is that the county incomes 
data (from which we obtain our estimate of first time buyer income) only provide mean data. There are no 
distributional data available to get median income at a county level from the CSO county incomes data. 
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by providing a more granular, county-level assessment of affordability for first 
time buyer households.  
 
We find that between the years 2016-2018 the mortgage-to-income ratio for 
potential first time buyers has increased across all counties. In 2018 the ratio 
would have been more than 30 per cent in Dublin, Wicklow, Kildare and Meath 
while in 11 of the 26 counties this ratio was at or below 20 per cent. In terms of 
residual income, we find that a first time buyer couple should have sufficient 
income left over after paying their mortgage instalments to attain at least a 
minimum level of consumption in all counties.  
 
This Note is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in the 
analysis and presents trends in county-level house prices and incomes. Section 3 
examines housing affordability for first time buyers. Section 4 explores trends in 
the residual income potential first time buyer households would have left after 
paying their monthly mortgage instalments. Section 5 extends the analysis 
beyond the county level to focus on key urban centres and Section 6 concludes.  
2. DATA 
One of the key challenges to assessing housing affordability at a regional level is 
to obtain granular data on both house prices and incomes. In this section we 
outline our data sources and our calculations of first time buyer house prices and 
incomes in each county which enable us to assess county-level housing 
affordability in Section 3.  
2.1 County house prices 
To assess the affordability challenges faced by first time buyers, we draw on both 
house price and income data at the county level. House price data were gathered 
from the Residential Property Price Index (RPPI) dataset which is compiled by the 
CSO.5 The primary source for this dataset is stamp duty receipts which are 
provided by the Revenue Commissioners. The Index provides data on the average 
level of prices paid for residential properties in Ireland on a monthly basis. 
Crucially for this study, the RPPI contains additional indicators on household 
purchases, including household buyer type. This allows us to gather information 
about house prices specifically for first time buyers. The dataset also contains a 
regional dimension which allows us to observe the heterogeneity of these first 
time buyer house prices across each county in the State.  
 
                                                          
 
5  The RPPI data exclude non-household purchases, non-market purchases and self-builds.  
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FIGURE 1 FIRST TIME BUYER MEAN HOUSE PRICE AND HOUSE PRICE GROWTH 2010-2018 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
Note:  2010 is the earliest year for which national house price data are available. 
 
Figure 1 shows the national trend in first time buyer (FTB) house prices from 
2010-2018. As illustrated by the dashed line, FTB house prices bottomed out in 
the country in 2013. Since then prices have risen year-on-year and in 2016 FTB 
house prices surpassed 2010 levels.  
 
However, this national level trend gives no indication of the heterogeneity of 
house prices across the country. Figure 2 shows the distribution of FTB house 
prices looking at the county with the highest and lowest mean house price in 
each year. Unsurprisingly, Dublin had the highest mean house price in each year, 
while either Longford or Leitrim had the lowest mean house price in each year. 
FTB house prices in the lowest priced county are still a long way off the levels 
they had been in 2010 and have only seen a small recovery in prices from where 
they were in 2013. FTB house prices in Dublin, on the other hand, have seen 
strong growth in prices and actually started to recover earlier with prices 
bottoming out in 2012. In Dublin FTB house prices surpassed 2010 levels in 2014 
and have continued to rise year-on-year ever since. Furthermore, in 2018 we 
observe that at just under €375,000, the mean FTB priced house in Dublin cost 
more than three times that of the mean FTB priced house in Longford (€116,000).  
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FIGURE 2 FIRST TIME BUYER MEAN HOUSE PRICE DISTRIBUTION 2010-2018 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
To examine county-level heterogeneity more closely, in Table 1 we present the 
mean FTB house price and growth rate for each county in 2018. Only Dublin, 
Wicklow and Kildare are above the national FTB average of €283,000, while the 
mean FTB house prices remain below – and in many cases well below – €200,000 
for 18 of the 26 counties. Figure 3 illustrates graphically this disparity in FTB 
house prices across the country. In addition to seeing the highest prices in Dublin 
and the Greater Dublin Area (GDA), the next highest priced counties are Cork, 
Galway, Limerick and Louth, while prices are lowest in the North-West of the 
country. 
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FIGURE 3 FIRST TIME BUYER MEAN HOUSE PRICE BY COUNTY 2018 
 
 
 Source: Central Statistics Office. 
 
In terms of house price growth, from Table 1 we see that on average FTB house 
prices increased by 7.3 per cent between 2017 and 2018, a slowing of the  
12.6 per cent growth seen between 2016 and 2017. Taking a longer-term 
perspective, we see that on average FTB house prices increased by 56.4 per cent 
over the period 2013-2018.6 Higher than average growth over that period was 
observed in counties surrounding Dublin; Louth, Meath and Kildare, as well as in 
Cork, Laois, Monaghan, Waterford and Wexford.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
6  2013 is used as this was the year in which the mean national first time buyer house price reached its nadir. However, 
it should be noted that the low point for house prices varies by county, with prices not bottoming out in some 
counties until 2015. 
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TABLE 1 FIRST TIME BUYER MEAN HOUSE PRICE AND HOUSE PRICE GROWTH BY COUNTY  
County Mean FTB HP 2018 (€) FTB HP growth  2017-2018 (%) 
FTP HP growth  
2013-2018 (%) 
All Counties 282,505 7.3 56.4 
Carlow 182,957 10.2 52.6 
Cavan 152,272 7.9 49.9 
Clare 187,401 15.0 51.3 
Cork 255,780 9.9 58.9 
Donegal 134,344 0.8 34.0 
Dublin 374,041 5.7 53.0 
Galway 226,884 4.8 53.3 
Kerry 180,137 2.1 31.8 
Kildare 296,656 5.6 61.1 
Kilkenny 191,497 11.5 38.8 
Laois 182,600 17.5 71.8 
Leitrim 119,725 2.3 46.3 
Limerick 213,252 14.7 51.7 
Longford 116,396 2.0 46.3 
Louth 212,962 10.7 69.5 
Mayo 149,949 3.4 26.5 
Meath 275,356 7.9 66.6 
Monaghan 168,591 6.5 56.6 
Offaly 161,067 -1.0 45.4 
Roscommon 133,498 10.5 36.6 
Sligo 155,188 15.0 36.6 
Tipperary 159,571 2.7 42.6 
Waterford 187,474 5.0 64.7 
Westmeath 178,721 11.1 55.4 
Wexford 182,380 12.5 66.5 
Wicklow 319,915 4.4 49.6 
 
Source:  CSO Table HPA02: Residential Dwelling Property Transactions by County, Dwelling Status, Stamp Duty Event, Type of Buyer, Type 
of Sale, Year and Statistic. Growth rates based on ESRI calculations.  
2.2 County incomes 
The most challenging aspect of assessing FTB housing affordability at a regional 
level is the lack of a suitable existing source of income data. In order to obtain a 
measure of first time buyer incomes, we combine data from two sources. First, 
we take the CSO per person disposable income excluding rent series 2000-2016.7 
As the most recent data available are for 2016, we use the annual growth in 
Average Hourly Earnings (McQuinn et al., 2019) to estimate income levels for 
2017-2018. In order to account for regional variation in the growth rate of 
incomes, we use the data for 2000-2016 to create a compound average growth 
 
                                                          
 
7  The exclusion of rental income is used as the county National Accounts include the rental income from landlords in 
the total income calculations. As we are attempting to gain information on first time buyers, we take the dataset 
which excludes the rental returns to landlords as this income should not accrue to non-homeowners. 
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rate for each county and then apply the relativities between this and the national 
annual growth from the QEC to create a regionally adjusted mean per person 
income for 2017-2018. As our focus in this Note is on first time buyers, we 
transform these per person figures into first time buyer couple household figures 
by multiplying them by 2.8  
 
Second, we then exploit the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC). SILC 
provides a detailed micro-level dataset of income and living conditions of 
households across Ireland and is conducted by the CSO on an annual basis. The 
advantage of using SILC is that it provides both income and age information for 
households. We proxy first time buyer incomes with the income of households 
aged 40 or under.9 In order to ensure sufficient observations for each county, we 
pool the data for 2014-2016. This gives us a measure of mean income for 
households of all ages and for those aged 40 or less in each county. We then 
apply the ratio of the income of those aged 40 or less to all aged households’ 
income from the SILC data to our adjusted CSO disposable income estimates to 
obtain an estimate of the mean annual first time buyer disposable income for 
each county. As the mean age of a first time buyer in 2018 in Ireland was 3410 
(Kinghan, 2018), we believe that adjusting the CSO per person disposable income 
levels by this age ratio from SILC provides a good proxy for potential first time 
buyer incomes.  
 
In Figure 4 we plot the distribution of FTB couples’ net after tax disposable 
incomes looking at the county with the highest and lowest mean income in each 
year. We see an increase in incomes from 2014 onwards, with the mean FTB 
couple’s disposable income reaching approximately €43,250 in 2018. In addition, 
Dublin has had the highest mean income each year, reaching €48,900 in 2018, 
while Donegal consistently had the lowest income, reaching just under €33,900 in 
2018. The mean FTB couple gross and disposable incomes for each county are 
reported in Table 2. In Figure 5 we present the mean FTB couple’s income in 2018 
graphically for each county. Figure 5 clearly shows that incomes are generally 
higher in the East and the South of the country.  
 
 
                                                          
 
8  It should be noted that there may be regional variation in the proportion of potential FTB who are single. Regions in 
which there is a greater proportion of single FTB are likely to face greater affordability challenges relative to regions 
with a greater proportion of FTB couples. 
9  We are unable to focus solely on private renters due to the insufficient number of observations for private renters at 
the county level in SILC.  
10  While the average age of first time buyers is likely to vary on a regional basis, we have no data on this at a regional 
level so are unable to explore this further.  
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A direct comparison between our estimated potential first time buyer mean 
income figures and another source is not possible.11 However, at this point it is 
useful to compare our estimates with the income levels of actual first time buyers 
accessing mortgage credit through the banking sector. New mortgage lending 
data from the Central Bank reports that the mean gross income of first time 
buyers in 2018 was €73,536.12 This is considerably higher than our national level 
potential FTB estimated mean gross income for 2018 of €56,825 reported in 
Table 2. That our figure is considerably lower is unsurprising as currently those 
households who are able to obtain a mortgage are situated in higher parts of the 
income distribution. Indeed Lydon and McCann (2017) show that more than  
90 per cent of first time buyer purchases in 2014 were to households in the top  
60 per cent of the population income distribution. Our measure is instead a 
measure which estimates the mean income of younger households (aged less 
than 40); those who are potential homeowners rather than actual homeowners. 
The difference in these two figures highlights the difficulty that these young, 
potential first time buyers have in actually becoming homeowners.  
 
FIGURE 4 POTENTIAL FIRST TIME BUYER MEAN DISPOSABLE INCOME BY COUNTY DISTRIBUTION 
2010-2018 
 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office. 
 
 
                                                          
 
11  As a very approximate comparison point we use CSO aggregate data on the average weekly household income by 
household composition and income decile which come originally from the Household Budget Survey 2015. This gives 
a national level mean annual disposable income of €44,148 for a two-adult household and a figure of €41,340 for the 
average of the 5th and 6th decile (as a proxy for the median) of the income distribution. Our 2015 calculated national 
disposable income level for a potential first time buyer couple of €41,038 therefore seems reasonable.   
12  See Central Bank of Ireland, New Mortgage Lending Data 2018. 
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TABLE 2 MEAN GROSS AND DISPOSABLE INCOME OF POTENTIAL FIRST TIME BUYER COUPLE BY 
COUNTY 2018  
County Mean Gross Income  (€) 
 Mean Disposable Income  
(€) 
All Counties 56,825 43,256 
Carlow 53,986 42,713 
Cavan 49,374 39,064 
Clare 48,307 38,220 
Cork 56,596 43,191 
Donegal 42,825 33,882 
Dublin 66,922 48,867 
Galway 47,182 36,712 
Kerry 50,264 39,769 
Kildare 56,324 42,122 
Kilkenny 51,239 40,540 
Laois 47,783 37,806 
Leitrim 51,344 40,623 
Limerick 53,548 42,366 
Longford 47,645 37,696 
Louth 48,700 38,531 
Mayo 47,114 37,276 
Meath 53,513 40,020 
Monaghan 47,929 37,921 
Offaly 45,811 36,245 
Roscommon 45,717 36,171 
Sligo 52,310 41,387 
Tipperary 53,967 42,698 
Waterford 49,435 39,112 
Westmeath 49,496 39,161 
Wexford 51,147 40,467 
Wicklow 54,178 40,517 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office. 
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FIGURE 5 POTENTIAL FIRST TIME BUYER MEAN DISPOSABLE INCOMES BY COUNTY 2018 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from Central Statistics Office and Survey of Income and Living Conditions. 
3. HOUSING AFFORDABILITY 
In order to examine how affordable the mean FTB priced house would be for a 
couple on the mean FTB income, we follow the approach discussed in Corrigan et 
al. (2019). To do this we calculate what the monthly payment would be on a 
mortgage if these households were to purchase the mean FTB priced house in 
each county. To calculate the payment, we use the following amortisation 
formula: 
𝑃𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 =  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑃𝑐𝑡 ∗ � 𝑟(1 + 𝑟)𝜏((1 + 𝑟)𝜏) − 1� 
 
As first time buyers, these households would face the maximum loan-to-value 
ratio (LTV) of 90 per cent, allowed by the Central Bank’s macroprudential 
mortgage rules. We take the average new business rate for household loans  
(3.02 per cent in 2018) from the Central Bank as the interest rate and use  
a standard 30-year term mortgage which is the most prevalent duration in the 
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market at present for first time buyers. Using this payment, we then calculate a 
mortgage repayment-to-income ratio (MRTI) for these households to test how 
affordable or not the market would be if they were to enter the mortgaged-
owner segment at the mean FTB house price. It must be noted that our 
assessment of repayment to income is not conducted from the lens of mortgage 
credit access. Borrowers would face higher interest rate stress tests when banks 
are looking at their affordability from a lending and viability perspective. 
 
In Table 3 we present these hypothetical monthly repayments and MRTIs for each 
county, without taking into account whether it would indeed be possible to 
achieve a mortgage under the current credit market conditions. Table 3 shows 
that FTB households in Dublin, as well as the surrounding commuter counties of 
Wicklow, Meath and Kildare would have to pay more than 30 per cent of their 
monthly income on their mortgage instalments.13 In Wicklow and Dublin, the 
MRTI is greater than or equal to 35 per cent, which is a commonly used 
benchmark in Irish policy on affordable housing. In Galway and Cork the figures 
are 28 and 27 per cent respectively. In contrast, in many of the more northern 
and western counties, households would pay less than 20 per cent of their 
incomes on these mortgage instalments. These instalments would exceed €1,000 
per month in Dublin, Wicklow, Meath and Kildare, with the mean payment in 
Cork just falling short of €1,000 per month.  
 
 
                                                          
 
13  30 per cent is used as a simple benchmark measure, one that is commonly used in the international housing 
affordability literature; it should not be seen as an absolute affordability cut-off. At the household level, Corrigan et 
al. (forthcoming) highlight the importance of a measure of affordability which combines both housing costs and 
income. As our focus in this Note is specifically on whether the mean potential FTB income would allow the purchase 
of the mean FTB priced house, we believe that this simple 30 per cent measure provides a useful guide to 
affordability.  
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TABLE 3  MEAN FIRST TIME BUYER MONTHLY MORTGAGE PAYMENT AND MORTGAGE 
REPAYMENT-TO-INCOME RATIOS BY COUNTY 2018 
County Payment (€) MRTI  County Payment (€) MRTI 
Carlow 696 0.20  Longford 443 0.14 
Cavan 579 0.18  Louth 810 0.25 
Clare 713 0.22  Mayo 570 0.18 
Cork 973 0.27  Meath 1,048 0.31 
Donegal 511 0.18  Monaghan 641 0.20 
Dublin 1,423 0.35  Offaly 613 0.20 
Galway 863 0.28  Roscommon 508 0.17 
Kerry 685 0.21  Sligo 590 0.17 
Kildare 1,129 0.32  Tipperary 607 0.17 
Kilkenny 728 0.22  Waterford 713 0.22 
Laois 695 0.22  Westmeath 680 0.21 
Leitrim 455 0.13  Wexford 694 0.21 
Limerick 811 0.23  Wicklow 1,217 0.36 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from Central Statistics Office, Central Bank of Ireland and Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions. 
 
In Figure 6 we present the MRTI for each county for 2016-2018 separately. Despite interest 
rates declining and income in each county increasing over this period, the MRTI ratio is 
shown to be increasing across a large range of counties. This is due to the rate of growth in 
house prices outstripping income growth over this period. The three maps reinforce the 
message from Table 3 that first time buyer affordability concerns are particularly 
concentrated in Dublin and the Greater Dublin Area (GDA). Furthermore, these maps 
illustrate how the MRTI has risen in a short space of time in certain areas. In particular 
between 2016 and 2017 the MRTI rose above 30 per cent in Kildare and Meath. The MRTI 
also rose above 20 per cent in Kerry, Clare, Limerick, Waterford, Laois, Westmeath and 
Offaly, while in 2018 the MRTI rose above 25 per cent in Louth. It is important to note that 
counties still represent a fairly large geographical area. For instance differences are likely 
between the urban area of Galway city and the more rural remainder of Galway county, 
and similarly for Cork. We address this in Section 5. There may also be other, smaller 
pockets of affordability challenges that we are unable to capture in this county-level 
analysis. One other point to note is that our analysis only focuses on a dual-earning couple. 
For single income households, the affordability challenges would be even more acute in 
those areas where prices are relatively high.  
 
In this analysis, we have not explored the feasibility of borrowing by the illustrative 
households. To successfully obtain a mortgage, such households would have to comply 
with both bank-specific underwriting standards (such as on affordability, income 
verification etc.) and regulations governing mortgage market activity in Ireland, in 
particular the macroprudential regulations which are critically important for financial 
stability. In some of the areas where we find high repayment-to-income levels (in particular 
Dublin and the surrounding counties), the implied loan-to-income ratio would likely be 
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above the limit allowable without exemption from the current regulations. Such 
households would have to purchase a house at a lower price than the average to meet 
current borrowing limits.  
 
This last point above points to a limitation with the current methodology that should be 
noted. By taking the mean house price for first time buyers and matching this to the mean 
income for potential first time buyers, we may overstate the affordability challenge facing 
such households. This is due to the fact that the average price facing potential FTBs at 
present is determined by the income levels of those FTBs who were able to purchase and 
whose income exceeds the average potential FTB income by some margin (Lydon and 
McCann, 2017). A potential FTB with the mean income can alternatively purchase a house 
with a price below that of the mean FTB house. If this is the case, then affordability would 
likely improve for this buyer as the house price would be lower. A fuller analysis which 
accounts for the differences across the price distribution is worthy of future research. 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  W i nt er  201 9  |  10 5  
 
FIGURE 6 FIRST TIME BUYER MEAN MORTGAGE REPAYMENT-TO-INCOME RATIO 2016-2018  
 (a) 2016      (b) 2017 
  
 (c) 2018 
     
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from Central Statistics Office, Central Bank of Ireland and Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions. 
4. RESIDUAL INCOME 
The analysis in Section 3 focused on the proportion of income spent on mortgage 
instalments as a measure of affordability. An alternative measure of affordability 
is to examine whether the residual income that remains after paying this 
mortgage instalment is sufficient to ensure some minimum level of consumption.  
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To explore this, we take the Minimum Essential Standard of Living (MESL) income 
for a childless working age couple defined by the Vincentian Partnership for 
Social Justice.14 They produce separate household budget expenditures for rural 
and urban areas on an annual basis. Based on whether it is possible to live in an 
area without car ownership, we classify all counties as rural except for Dublin.15 It 
is important to note that any measure of the minimum level of required income is 
somewhat subjective. 
 
In Figure 7 we map the ratio of residual income to MESL income as an alternative 
indicator of homeownership affordability for a first time buyer couple.16 The first 
thing to note is that this ratio is greater than 1 in all counties. This indicates that a 
first time buyer couple on the mean income buying the mean FTB priced house 
will have sufficient income left over after paying their mortgage instalments to 
attain at least a minimum level of consumption. However, it must be noted that 
we conduct this analysis of residual income based on the household expenditure 
of a working age childless couple. Inevitably some of these young couples will 
wish to start a family and this analysis would not take these increased expenses 
of children and childcare costs into account. Furthermore, while a ratio of  
1.25-1.5 would enable a couple to attain a minimum level of consumption, it 
would not leave them with a significant amount of residual income. In terms of 
the variation across the country, the lowest ratios are observed in Galway, Clare, 
Donegal, Offaly, Laois and Louth as well as in the GDA counties of Wicklow, 
Kildare and Meath. However, though they share a similar low ratio of residual 
income to MESL, the reasoning behind the low ratio varies by county. For 
example in Donegal the ratio is low due to relatively low income in that county 
while in the GDA the ratio is low due to the relatively high price of housing.  
 
 
                                                          
 
14  The Minimum Essential Standard of Living (MESL) income measure includes spending on the following items: food, 
clothing, personal care, healthcare, household goods, household services, communications, social inclusion, 
education, transport, household energy, personal costs, insurance, savings and contingencies. This measure excludes 
childcare and the effects of secondary benefits.  
15  In practice the differences between these rural and urban series for a couple without children are relatively small and 
make little difference to our estimates.  
16  As the purpose of this paper is to assess affordability for a first time buyer couple, the MESL we use for this exercise 
is for a couple without any children. As the number of children within a family increases, the MESL for that family will 
also increase, leading to a decrease in the income to MESL ratio. The ratios that we present can therefore be thought 
of as base cases that will likely deteriorate the more dependants there are in a family. 
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FIGURE 7 RATIO OF RESIDUAL INCOME-TO-MINIMUM ESSENTIAL STANDARD OF LIVING 
INCOME BY COUNTY 2018  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from Central Statistics Office, Central Bank of Ireland, Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions and Vincentian Partnership. 
5. A FOCUS ON THE URBAN CENTRES 
In Section 3 we noted that counties still represent a fairly large geographical area. 
As previously discussed, differences are likely between the urban area of Galway 
City and the more rural remainder of Galway County, and similarly for Cork. Given 
the already substantial challenges of obtaining data which permit analysis of 
housing affordability at the county level, analysis at a more granular regional level 
is not possible for much of the country. Nevertheless, in this section we do 
provide a more granular regional analysis for Dublin, Cork and Galway. 
Specifically, we split Dublin into its four local authorities, namely Dublin City, 
South Dublin, Fingal and Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown, and we separate Cork and 
Galway into City (urban) and County (rural). 
 
From Table 4 it is evident that there are significant differences in the price of FTB 
houses between different areas in the same counties. In Dublin, Dún Laoghaire-
Rathdown had by far the highest mean FTB house price of €520,000 which was  
57 per cent greater than Fingal, the lowest priced area in the capital. In Galway 
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there was a significant difference in price between Galway City and Galway 
County (rural) of €54,000. This urban rural gap is smaller in Cork where mean 
house prices in Cork City are roughly €15,000 higher than in the county (rural). 
 
TABLE 4 FIRST TIME BUYER MEAN HOUSE PRICE AND HOUSE PRICE GROWTH BY AREA 2018  
Area Mean FTB HP (€) FTB HP growth  2017-2018 (%) 
FTB HP growth  
2013-2018 (%) 
Dublin City 382,344 8.8 68.4 
South Dublin 339,445 5.2 56.9 
Fingal 330,640 6.3 53.7 
Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown 519,767 6.4 41.1 
Cork County 252,990 8.3 55.7 
Cork City 268,139 16.8 72.6 
Galway County 208,589 7.8 53.7 
Galway City 262,638 4.3 52.9 
 
Source:  CSO Table HPA03: Market-based Household Purchases of Residential Dwellings by Dwelling Status, Stamp Duty Event, RPPI 
Region, Type of Buyer, Year and Statistic. Growth rates based on ESRI calculations.  
 
In Table 5 we present both gross and disposable potential FTB incomes by within 
county area. As with house prices, Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown has by far the 
highest income in Dublin, with a mean gross income of more than €12,000 more 
than in Dublin City. Incomes are higher in Cork County than City, but the opposite 
is true for Galway with higher incomes in the city area. This highlights the fact 
that housing affordability is likely to be more nuanced than a simple rural/urban 
divide. 
 
TABLE 5 MEAN GROSS AND DISPOSABLE INCOME OF POTENTIAL FIRST TIME BUYER COUPLE BY 
AREA 2018  
Area Mean Gross Income 2018 (€) Mean Disposable Income 2018 (€) 
Dublin City 60,158 43,928 
South Dublin 63,425 46,313 
Fingal 73,103 53,380 
Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown 77,162 56,344 
Cork County 58,137 44,367 
Cork City 49,120 37,487 
Galway County 43,112 33,545 
Galway City 58,665 45,647 
 
Source:  ESRI calculations based on CSO disposable income per person excluding rent, gross income per person and SILC data.  
Note: Incomes are calculated using the method discussed in Section 2.2. We use the relativities between income levels for these 
areas in SILC to obtain estimates for these within county areas based on the CSO data.  
 
In Table 6 we present the hypothetical mean monthly mortgage instalment, MRTI 
and the MESL residual income ratio for each area. We observe substantial 
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variation in MRTI ratios across Dublin, ranging from 28 per cent in Fingal up to  
42 per cent in Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown, with the most central area of Dublin City 
not far behind at 40 per cent. In Cork there is a substantially higher MRTI of  
33 per cent in the city area compared to 26 per cent in the county. In Galway the 
difference is much smaller, with a slightly higher MRTI of 28 per cent in the 
county compared to 26 per cent in the city, likely driven by the substantially 
lower levels of income observed in Galway County.  
 
TABLE 6 MEAN FIRST TIME BUYER MORTGAGE REPAYMENT, MRTI, AND MESL INCOME RATIOS 
BY AREA 2018 
Area Payment (€) MRTI  MESL Income Ratio 
Dublin City 1,454 0.40 1.38 
South Dublin 1,291 0.33 1.61 
Fingal 1,258 0.28 2.00 
Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown 1,977 0.42 1.70 
Cork County 962 0.26 1.64 
Cork City 1,020 0.33 1.32 
Galway County 794 0.28 1.20 
Galway City 999 0.26 1.76 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from Central Statistics Office, Central Bank of Ireland, Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions and Vincentian Partnership. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this Research Note we provide an examination of housing affordability for 
potential first time buyers at the county level in Ireland. More specifically, we 
calculate the mortgage payment and subsequent mortgage repayment-to-income 
ratio they would face if they were to purchase a property at the mean first time 
buyer price in each county.  
 
We find that the proportion of income potential first time buyers would have to 
spend on mortgage repayments increased between 2016 and 2018. In 2018 these 
potential first time buyers would have faced a mortgage repayment-to-income 
ratio of more than 30 per cent in Dublin, Wicklow, Kildare and Meath, while in 11 
of the 26 counties this ratio remained at or below 20 per cent In terms of residual 
income. We show that a first time buyer couple on the mean income buying the 
mean FTB priced house will have sufficient income left over after paying their 
mortgage instalments to attain at least a minimum level of consumption in all 
counties. 
 
In this Note our analysis only focuses on a dual-earning couple who earn the 
mean first time buyer income, attempting to buy the mean first time buyer priced 
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house in each county. The affordability challenges for potential first time buyers 
at the lower end of the income distribution will be even greater, particularly in 
the Dublin, GDA, Cork and Galway areas. In areas where those earning the mean 
income are unable to borrow at a 90 per cent LTV and meet the LTI limits, they 
are likely to purchase houses at the lower end of the house price distribution. 
This may represent a further challenge to lower-income potential homeowners. 
The affordability challenges faced by single earner households will also be greater 
than for dual-earner households. An examination of this is outside the scope of 
this study. Further research could also explore the rent-to-income ratio and 
undertake a deeper dive of affordability trends in the private rental market at a 
county level.  
 
Several subsidy schemes for FTBs have been introduced in recent years, such as 
the Help to Buy incentive and the Rebuilding Ireland Home Loan. However, these 
instruments must be complemented by the expansion of the housing stock and 
the provision of alternative rental models. 
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